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Tragically, faith communities and their houses of worship are
all too familiar with problems of sexual misconduct by members
of the clergy. For the past several decades, the law courts and the
news have been thick with stories of sexual abuse of minors by
people with religious authority—stories that involve damaged
lives, and tarnished images of institutions that hold themselves
out as existing only for spiritual and social good.1
In addition to the abuse of minors and its attendant concealment, however, the experience of religious institutions includes
other stories of sex related misbehavior.2 These involve women
and men, serving or training as clergy in a variety of religious
denominations, who have suffered sexual harassment by their
supervisors—usually, though not always, clergy themselves.3 In
this context, perhaps less frequent and certainly less visible, the
law both supports and impedes members of the clergy seeking to
remedy such mistreatment. This Article offers a normatively compelling and constitutionally appropriate way of reconciling these
competing legal forces.
We start with law’s apparent disregard for claims by clergy
who allege sexual victimization in the workplace, through harassment or otherwise. The Religion Clauses of the First Amendment
bar most lawsuits, including claims of discrimination, by clergy
against their employers.4 Suits claiming unlawful discrimination
in employment, in particular, are generally precluded by a doctrine known as the “ministerial exception.”5 After forty years of
recognition of the ministerial exception in the lower courts, a
1. We explore a variety of legal issues raised by suits arising from sexual abuse by
clergy. See Ira C. Lupu & Robert W. Tuttle, Sexual Misconduct and Ecclesiastical
Immunity, 2004 BYU L. REV. 1789 (2004) [hereinafter Lupu & Tuttle, Ecclesiastical
Immunity].
2. See Lupu & Tuttle, Ecclesiastical Immunity, supra note 1, at 1794.
3. See id. at 1795.
4. In earlier work, we analyzed a broad variety of such cases. See Ira C. Lupu &
Robert W. Tuttle, Courts, Clergy, and Congregations: Disputes Between Religious
Institutions and Their Leaders, 7 GEO. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 119, 121 (2009) [hereinafter
Lupu & Tuttle, Courts, Clergy, and Congregations]. We note but do not explore in that
article the sexual harassment issues discussed at length in this article. Id. at 134 n.84.
We also touch on sexual harassment cases. Ira C. Lupu & Robert W. Tuttle, The Mystery
of Unanimity in Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & School v. EEOC, 20
LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 1265, 1287, 1303 (2017) [hereinafter Lupu & Tuttle, The Mystery
of Unanimity].
5. Id. at 1278–79.
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unanimous Supreme Court in 2012 affirmed the constitutional
provenance and the broad reach of that exception.6 As explicated
in Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & School v.
EEOC,7 the exception applies to a sweeping range of anti-discrimination norms, and it extends to a broad category of employees
whose job includes responsibilities to teach the faith.8
A close inspection of the law that has developed under the
ministerial exception, however, reveals that claims of sexual harassment based on a pervasive, hostile environment are not subject to that limitation on suits by clergy.9 The earliest such decision came from the Minnesota Court of Appeals in 1991,10 and a
pair of prominent and controversial decisions emerged from the
Ninth Circuit in 1999 and 2004.11 Moreover, the U.S. Supreme
Court’s broad decision
in Hosanna-Tabor has not produced any change in the law governing sexual harassment claims, based on a pervasive hostile
environment, by clergy against their employers.12
Both before and after Hosanna-Tabor, the question presented
by the apparent tension between sexual harassment claims and
the ministerial exception has received little attention from scholars of employment law13 or the Religion Clauses of the First
6. Id. at 1274.
7. 565 U.S. 171, 196 (2012).
8. Id. at 173.
9. See, e.g., Black v. Snyder, 471 N.W.2d 715, 715–16 (Minn. Ct. App. 1991).
10. Id. at 721.
11. Elvig v. Calvin Presbyterian Church, 375 F.3d 951, 969 (9th Cir. 2004), reh’g
denied, 397 F.3d 790 (9th Cir. 2005); Bollard v. Cal. Province of the Soc’y of Jesus, 196
F.3d 940, 948 (9th Cir. 1999). In Elvig, the Ninth Circuit produced a cluster of opinions
related to the denial of en banc review. In Part III, below, we will explore the themes in
these opinions, including one from Judge Kozinski, who recently retired from the bench
in the wake of his own harassment scandal. In accord with Bollard is McKelvey v.
Pierce, 800 A.2d 840, 854 (N.J. 2002). The highest level decision rejecting the sexual
harassment exception to the ministerial exception is Skrzypczak v. Roman Catholic
Diocese, 611 F.3d 1238, 1246 (10th Cir. 2010), noted in Part IV.
12. Lupu & Tuttle, The Mystery of Unanimity, supra note 4, at 1287–92.
13. The leading practitioner guide on workplace harassment law, BARBARA T.
LINDEMANN & DAVID D. KADUE, WORKPLACE HARASSMENT LAW (2d ed., BNA 2012), does
not even mention the ministerial exception, or the sexual harassment decisions that
either follow or refuse to follow the exception. The only published works we have found
that are primarily devoted to the tension between harassment law and the religion
clauses of the First Amendment are by Rosalie Berger Levinson and Ryan Jaziri. See
Rosalie Berger Levinson, Gender Equality vs. Religious Autonomy: Suing Religious
Employers for Sexual Harassment After Hosanna-Tabor, 11 Stan. J. C.R. & C.L. 89, 92
(2015); see also Ryan W. Jaziri, Note, Fixing a Crack in the Wall of Separation: Why the
Religion Clauses Preclude Adjudication of Sexual Harassment Claims Brought by
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Amendment.14 The employment law concerns are complex, and
the constitutional issues raised by the interaction of sexual harassment law and the ministerial exception are even more so.
Moreover, analyzing this intersection of employment law and the
First Amendment illuminates both. Hosanna-Tabor has thrown
Free Exercise law into considerable doubt,15 and unpacking the
harassment question will help clarify the changes, if any, to free
exercise norms worked by Hosanna-Tabor.
This Article is thus designed to fill a long-standing
gap—made conspicuous by recent developments—in the relevant
literature. Part I describes the contours of the ministerial exception, explains its constitutional provenance, and highlights the
issues left open by the Supreme Court’s sole encounter with the
exception in Hosanna-Tabor. Part II addresses relevant developments in the law of sexual harassment, from the pioneering work
of Professor Catharine MacKinnon,16 through and including the
Supreme Court’s crucial decisions in Meritor Savings Bank, FSB
v. Vinson,17 Harris v. Forklift Systems, Inc.,18 Burlington Industries, Inc. v. Ellerth,19 and Faragher v. City of Boca Raton.20 A central theme—crucial to the intersection between sexual harassment law and the ministerial exception—in that development is
the distinction between (1) claims of adverse job actions (firing,
Ministers, 45 NEW ENG. L. REV. 719, 719 (2011).
14. We are among the very few Religion Clause scholars who have ever focused on
these questions. See Lupu & Tuttle, Ecclesiastical Immunity, supra note 1, at 1794 n.16;
see also Caroline Mala Corbin, Above the Law? The Constitutionality of the Ministerial
Exemption from Antidiscrimination Law, 75 FORD. L. REV. 1965, 2015 n.338 (2007)
[hereinafter Corbin, Above the Law].
15. In recent work, we cited the broad range of scholarly views on the ministerial
exception and discussed each of them at length. See Lupu & Tuttle, The Mystery of
Unanimity, supra note 4, at 1292–1314. Within those pages, see in particular the sources
cited in n.157 (the “institutionalists)”; n.171 (the “implied consent” theorists), n.197 (the
associational freedom theorists); and n.225 (the feminist critics). Professor Nelson
Tebbe’s recent book places the ministerial exception squarely within a generic concept
of associational freedom to choose leaders, available without regard to the association’s
religious character. See generally NELSON TEBBE, RELIGIOUS FREEDOM IN AN
EGALITARIAN AGE 80–97 (Harv. Univ. Press 2017). The Court in Hosanna-Tabor
explicitly rejected this as the basis for the ministerial exception. See Hosanna-Tabor
Evangelical Lutheran Church & School v. EEOC, 565 U.S. 171, 189 (2012).
16. See generally CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, SEXUAL HARASSMENT OF WORKING
WOMEN (Yale Univ. Press 1979).
17. 477 U.S. 57 (1986).
18. 510 U.S. 17 (1993).
19. 542 U.S. 742, 763 (1998).
20. 524 U.S. 775, 807–08 (1998).
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demotion, etc.) resulting from a legally wrongful attention to sex
in the workplace, and (2) claims that involve a severe and pervasive hostile environment, independent of any adverse job action.
In Part III, #MeToo meets the ministerial exception. Part III
explores the leading judicial opinions on the relationship between
sexual harassment law and the exception. These include the germinal state court decisions in Black v. Snyder21 and McKelvey v.
Pierce,22 and the path breaking Ninth Circuit decisions in Bollard
v. California Province of the Society of Jesus,23 and Elvig v. Calvin
Presbyterian Church.24 In the law that has emerged, the ministerial exception bars adverse job action claims but does not bar hostile environment claims.25 That brief statement, however, masks
the analytical complexities and constitutional concerns arising
from the interplay between harassment law and the ministerial
exception. These concerns include matters of discovery, remedies,
and the substance of affirmative defenses to hostile environment
claims.
Part IV applies our theoretical and doctrinal insights to the
major questions raised by this interplay. In our view, the ministerial exception arises from government’s constitutionally
mandated disability to decide ecclesiastical questions.26 Fitness
for ministry—of a class of persons, or a particular person—is such
a question. Accordingly, we argue that the First Amendment
should bar adjudications that sexual harassment played an unlawful part in adverse job actions against clergy, and should bar
remedial orders of reinstatement and compensatory front pay
awards in all harassment cases. In contrast, we contend that the
21. 471 N.W.2d 715, 720–21 (Minn. Ct. App. 1991).
22. 800 A.2d 840, 858 (N.J. 2002).
23. 196 F.3d 940, 950 (9th Cir. 1999).
24. 375 F.3d 951, 969 (9th Cir. 2004). Elvig offers the added bonus of an opinion by
now retired Judge Kozinski. See id. at 790 (Kozinski, J., concurring in denial of
rehearing en banc). Kozinski, now retired, is no stranger to issues of a sexually hostile
environment. See Niraj Chokshi, Federal Judge Alex Kozinski Retires Abruptly After
Sexual Harassment Allegations, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 18, 2017),
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/12/18/us/alex-kozinski-retires.html
[https://perma.cc/3VQP-S7KQ].
25. See Elvig, 375 F.3d at 953, reh’g denied, Elvig, 397 F.3d at 790.
26. The concepts of Establishment Clause disability, and corresponding immunity of
religious entities, build on a Hohfeldian conception of legal relationships. See Lupu &
Tuttle, Courts, Clergy, and Congregations, supra note 4, at 122 n.20; see also Frederick
M. Gedicks, The Religious-Question Doctrine: Free-Exercise Right or Anti-Establishment
Immunity? 7 (Robert Schuman Ctr. for Advanced Stud. Research Paper No. RSCAS
2016/10), https://ssrn.com/abstract=2746593.
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First Amendment’s Religion Clauses should not bar either compensatory or punitive damage claims for pervasive, hostile environments based on sex. These are claims from which religious
institutions are not immune. We unpack the particular constitutional questions that arise when religious institutions invoke the
affirmative defenses available to employers in hostile environment cases. In short, we think that courts have made the correct
opening moves in these cases, but that Hosanna-Tabor and the
rise of the #MeToo movement invite new and more theoretically
refined consideration of the relevant questions.
We expect that our conclusions will not satisfy ardent proponents of church autonomy,27 who would like full immunity for
houses of worship in all litigation by clergy. Nor will our approach
give much comfort to those who would eliminate or significantly
confine the ministerial exception.28 Our analysis represents a
challenge, made explicit in Part IV, to anyone who offers a robust
theory, different from our own, in support of the ministerial exception. Whether the law should recognize a sexual harassment
exception to the ministerial exception turns entirely on the
deeper, often unstated premises underlying each.
I. THE MINISTERIAL EXCEPTION
In Hosanna-Tabor,29 decided in 2012, a unanimous Supreme
Court held that the Religion Clauses of the First Amendment insulate religious institutions from liability for employment
discrimination against members of the clergy. The case involved
retaliation against a religious schoolteacher, Cheryl Perich, who
had complained to the EEOC about alleged discrimination based

27. See Lupu & Tuttle, The Mystery of Unanimity, supra note 4, at 1296 n.157.
28. See Joanne C. Brant, “Our Shield Belongs to the Lord”: Religious Employers and
a Constitutional Right to Discriminate, 21 HASTINGS CON. L.Q. 275, 281 (1994); Leslie
C. Griffin, The Sins of Hosanna-Tabor, 88 Ind. L.J. 981, 983 (2013); Jane Rutherford,
Equality as the Primary Constitutional Value: The Case for Applying Employment
Discrimination Laws to Religion, 81 CORN. L. REV. 1049, 1059–60 (1996); Robin West,
Freedom of the Church and Our Endangered Civil Rights: Exiting the Social Contract,
in MICAH SCHWARTZMAN, CHAD FLANDERS & ZOË ROBINSON, THE RISE OF CORPORATE
RELIGIOUS LIBERTY 399, 399–418 (2016); see also Frederick Mark Gedicks, Narrative
Pluralism and Doctrinal Incoherence in Hosanna-Tabor, 64 MERCER L. REV. 405, 434–35
(2013). See generally Corbin, Above the Law, supra note 14.
29. Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & School v. EEOC, 565 U.S. 171,
196 (2012).
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on disability.30 In response to that complaint, her employer had
fired her.31
As the Court viewed the case, the Establishment Clause and
the Free Exercise Clause operate together to create an affirmative defense to employment discrimination claims by a ministerial
employee in a case that involved a judgment about her fitness for
ministry.32 Ms. Perich’s pedagogical duties, combined with her
status as an ordained teacher, rendered her a ministerial
employee as a matter of law.33 In the eyes of her employer, her
complaint to the EEOC had rendered her unfit for that position.34
Hosanna-Tabor was unsurprising in some very basic
respects. The proposition that the Religion Clauses immunize
religious employers with respect to adverse employment actions
against employees in clergy roles was hardly new in 2012.35 The
Fifth Circuit started down this path in 1972, and over the next
forty years every federal circuit court of appeals and many state
supreme courts followed suit.36 Indeed, no court in the United
States ever disputed the basic constitutional idea behind what
had come to be known as the “ministerial exception” to employment laws.37 Courts had applied the exception to every form of job
discrimination forbidden by federal or state law, including that
based on race, sex, national origin, age, disability, and sexual orientation, along with related employee protections such as wage
and hour laws.38 Moreover, the exception had not been limited to
cases of overt exclusion from ministry, for example in the Roman
Catholic Church, Islam, or Orthodox Judaism.39 It extended to all
claims of discrimination, whether overt or covert.40
The issue most likely to be controverted in ministerial exception cases is whether the complainant’s duties fall under the exception.41 This must be litigated case by case, and actual duties,
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.

See id. at 172.
See id.
See id. at 184.
See id. at 191–94.
See id.
See Hosanna-Tabor, 565 U.S. at 173.
See Lupu & Tuttle, Courts, Clergy, and Congregations, supra note 4, at 121.
Id. at 122.
Id. at 127–28.
Id. at 123.
The litigated cases all involved claims of covert discrimination. See id. at 128.
If the court finds the exception does not apply in the particular case, then other
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not job titles or even ordained status, control the outcome.42
Hosanna-Tabor, in its close analysis of Cheryl Perich’s job responsibilities, confirmed that long-standing judicial approach.43
In other ways, however, Hosanna-Tabor was unsettling. The
Court’s unanimity seemed difficult to explain. This was not a lawsuit by a woman seeking to be ordained as a Catholic priest, Orthodox Jewish rabbi, or Muslim imam.44 The case thus did not
involve a paradigm situation of formal gender exclusion from the
relevant job.45 Why should the ministerial exception protect
houses of worship, holding themselves out as equal opportunity
employers, from liability for failure to act accordingly? Along
these lines, a number of feminist legal scholars had authored significant critiques of the ministerial exception,46 and no one expected every Justice to accept the exception’s full sweep.
Moreover, in addition to allegations of discrimination,
Hosanna-Tabor involved retaliation for a complaint to public authorities.47 The policies behind protecting such complaints extend
to protecting others beyond the complainants themselves.48 And
yet these policies quite literally received no weight in the Court’s
analysis.49
The mystery of unanimity was compounded further by the
considerable tension between prevailing doctrines of the Free Exercise Clause, as generated by the decision in Employment Division v. Smith,50 and the operation of the ministerial exception.
issues open up. This Article does not explore questions involving whether particular jobs
qualify for the exception. We discuss why such issues must remain open to adjudication.
See Lupu & Tuttle, The Mystery of Unanimity, supra note 4, at 1278–80.
42. Id. at 1278.
43. See Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & School v. EEOC, 565 U.S.
171, 191–94 (2012).
44. See id. at 171.
45. See id. at 179.
46. Caroline Corbin has the most extensive critique. See generally Corbin, Above the
Law, supra note 14. In Hosanna-Tabor, Professor Corbin presented her views to the
Court in an amicus brief, co-authored by Professor Leslie Griffin. See Brief for Prof.
Leslie C. Griffin et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondents, Hosanna-Tabor
Evangelical Lutheran Church and School v. EEOC, 565 U.S. 171 (2012) (No. 10-533).
47. See 565 U.S. at 172.
48. See Lupu & Tuttle, The Mystery of Unanimity, supra note 4, at 1305.
49. The Court refused to balance interests in Hosanna-Tabor. See 565 U.S. at 196
(“When a minister who has been fired sues her church alleging that her termination was
discriminatory, the First Amendment has struck the balance for us.”). We discuss the
constitutional significance of the refusal to balance interests. See Lupu & Tuttle, The
Mystery of Unanimity, supra note 4, at 1275–78.
50. 494 U.S. 872, 906–07 (1990).
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Smith held that the Free Exercise Clause does not support exemptions to religion-neutral, generally applicable regulation of
conduct—in Smith, the regulation of use and possession of peyote
was at issue.51 The ministerial exception operates precisely to
create a defense to generally applicable regulations of the employment relationship.52 Chief Justice Roberts’s effort to distinguish
Hosanna-Tabor from Smith on the ground that the former
involved an “internal church decision . . . affect[ing] the faith and
mission of the church itself” while the latter involved outward
“physical acts” is not coherent.53 Using peyote in sacraments is a
decision about faith and mission, and a dismissal of an employee
is an outward act with physical manifestations and
consequences.54
In an article published in early 2017, we set out to solve the
mysteries of Hosanna-Tabor, including its unanimous character.55
We cannot concisely summarize our complex argument and its
supporting authority, but its essence will be central to
understanding our analysis of the sexual harassment questions
considered in this Article.
Building on an elaborate body of prior work, we argue that
the ministerial exception is an application of a broader principle
that the state (including its judges) is constitutionally disabled
from deciding purely ecclesiastical questions.56 That broader principle has been applied in numerous decisions involving church
property57 or personnel.58 It rests on both the Establishment
Clause, which bars the state from exercising ecclesiastical functions, and the Free Exercise Clause, which reserves those func51. See id. at 904–05.
52. See Hosanna-Tabor, 565 U.S. at 190.
53. Id. Although we think the ministerial exception is constitutionally sound, we are
deep skeptics with respect to any general doctrine of Free Exercise exemptions from
general law. See IRA C. LUPU & ROBERT W. TUTTLE, SECULAR GOVERNMENT, RELIGIOUS
PEOPLE 177–210 (2014) [hereinafter LUPU & TUTTLE, SECULAR GOVERNMENT]; Ira C.
Lupu, Hobby Lobby and the Dubious Enterprise of Religious Exemptions, 38 HARV. J.L.
& GENDER 35, 55 (2015).
54. Hosanna-Tabor, 565 U.S. at 173.
55. See generally Lupu & Tuttle, The Mystery of Unanimity, supra note 4.
56. Id. at 1280–84. See LUPU & TUTTLE, SECULAR GOVERNMENT, supra note 53, at
43–73; see also Lupu & Tuttle, The Mystery of Unanimity, supra note 4, at 1280–85. See
generally Peter J. Smith & Robert W. Tuttle, Civil Procedure and the Ministerial
Exception, 86 FORD. L. REV. 1847 (2017).
57. See, e.g., Presbyterian Church v. Mary Elizabeth Blue Hull Memorial
Presbyterian Church, 393 U.S. 440, 441, 451 (1969).
58. See generally Serbian E. Orthodox Diocese v. Milivojevich, 426 U.S. 696 (1976).
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tions for private decision makers.59 The Hosanna-Tabor opinion
appropriately cites both Clauses in support of the ministerial exception,60 though its explicit avoidance of interest balancing as a
methodology demonstrates its tilt toward the Establishment
Clause.61
Hosanna-Tabor emphatically supports our approach in every
relevant respect. In the context of claims that an employer has
unlawfully discriminated against a person with ministerial responsibilities—that is, a person whose duties include teaching
and communicating the faith—the state’s disability to decide ecclesiastical questions translates into a bar on state evaluation of
whether any particular person is fit for ministry.62 The bar operates both categorically (e.g., are women or men as a class fit for
ministry?) and individually (i.e., is this particular person fit for
ministry?).63 If faith communities are immune from liability under anti-discrimination laws when these communities impose a
categorical bar, they are equally immune when they impose a
weaker version of it in individual cases (i.e., does this conduct by
a woman pastor render her unfit for ministry, even if it might not
render a man unfit?). The ministerial exception sits comfortably
within the category of ecclesiastical questions, off limits to the
state.64 Decisions in the lower courts before Hosanna-Tabor, and
continuing unbroken after Hosanna-Tabor, are thoroughly consistent with this understanding, and frequently confirm in explicit
terms that ecclesiastical questions present a constitutional
boundary.65 This proposition, long settled in First Amendment
law, completely explains the unanimity in Hosanna-Tabor.66
The immunity of religious employers that is triggered by the
ministerial exception does not signify that actions shielded by the
exception operate under a halo of moral right. The exception may
protect decisions about fitness for ministry—for example, on racial grounds—that most people in our society would find repre59. See, e.g., Hosanna-Tabor, 565 U.S. at 184.
60. Id. at 184.
61. See Lupu & Tuttle, The Mystery of Unanimity, supra note 4, at 1275–78.
62. See id. at 1280.
63. See id. at 1283.
64. See id. at 1280.
65. We cite virtually all the relevant post Hosanna-Tabor decisions (2012–2017). See
Lupu & Tuttle, The Mystery of Unanimity, supra note 4, at 1287–92.
66. See id. at 1291–92.
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hensible.67 The exception is grounded on the constitutionally salutary policy of removing the state from decision of distinctively
religious questions, and is obviously no guarantee that religious
institutions will decide these questions wisely or virtuously.68
In ways that resonate directly with the topic of this Article,
Hosanna-Tabor hints suggestively at the boundaries of the ministerial exception. The EEOC, in opposing recognition of a constitutionally based ministerial exception to anti-discrimination norms,
had argued in the Supreme Court that:
[S]uch an exception could protect religious organizations from
liability for retaliating against employees for reporting criminal misconduct or for testifying before a grand jury or in a
criminal trial. . . . [T]he logic of the exception would confer on
religious employers ‘unfettered discretion’ to violate employment laws by, for example, hiring children or aliens not authorized to work in the United States.69

To this quite reasonable set of concerns about the ministerial
exception’s slippery slope, the Court replied:
The case before us is an employment discrimination suit
brought on behalf of a minister, challenging her church’s decision to fire her. Today we hold only that the ministerial exception bars such a suit. We express no view on whether the exception bars other types of suits, including actions by employees alleging breach of contract or tortious conduct by their
religious employers. There will be time enough to address the
applicability of the exception to other circumstances if and
when they arise.70

As we explore in further detail in Part III, sexual harassment
claims present a mixture of concerns sounding in both tort and
contract.71 Unlike the typical ministerial exception case, which
involves an adverse job action by the employer against a person
in ministry, the questions raised by claims of pervasive and hostile work environment are not about the complainant’s fitness for
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.

See id. at 1282.
Id.
Hosanna-Tabor, 565 U.S. at 195.
Id. at 196.
See infra Part III.
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the position.72 Hosanna-Tabor thus leaves wide open the questions we are considering.73
The Hosanna-Tabor opinion emphasized one additional point
that runs through the decisions, canvassed in Part III, in which
#MeToo meets the ministerial exception. To the argument that
the church lacked religious justification for firing Ms. Perich, the
Court replied:
That suggestion misses the point of the ministerial exception.
The purpose of the exception is not to safeguard a church’s
decision to fire a minister only when it is made for a religious
reason. The exception instead ensures that the authority to
select and control who will minister to the faithful—a matter
‘strictly ecclesiastical,’ . . . is the church’s alone.74

This move is easily misunderstood. It filters the argument
about the quality of a church’s reasons through the prism of
“strictly ecclesiastical” matters, constitutionally off limits from
state decision.75 But it does not suggest that “religious reasons”
are always irrelevant to application of the law to religious organizations.76 As we explain in Parts III–IV, the relationship between
“religious reasons” and claims of a pervasive, hostile environment
based on sex reverberates through the case law in ways that deserve deeper exploration.
II. THE RELEVANT LAW OF SEXUAL HARASSMENT
The law of sexual harassment has developed considerably
from Professor Catharine MacKinnon’s path-breaking work,77
published in 1979, to its more recent refinements in the Supreme
Court. The conduct that falls under the legal label of sexual harassment involves a variety of harms to its victims.78 In some of
72. See Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 23 (1993).
73. Hosanna-Tabor, 565 U.S. at 171, 196.
74. Id. at 194–95 (citing Kedroff v. St. Nicholas Cathedral, 344 U.S. 94, 119 (1952)).
75. Id.
76. Id. at 194–96.
77. MACKINNON, supra note 16, at vii.
78. Men as well as women can be harassed, and the harasser may be of the same sex
as the target. See generally Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 523 U.S. 75, 76
(1998). Two of the decisions we highlight in Part III involve sexual harassment of males
by other males.
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its variations, the harm is strongly or entirely akin to that of
physical sexual assault, prohibited in the criminal law and actionable in the law of torts.79 In other iterations, the harm is neither criminal nor tortious in the common law sense, but it nevertheless involves the quite serious upset, demoralization, and interference with employment opportunity that follows from persistent and unwelcome sexual attention.80 Sexual attention may begin with a veneer of positivity, as in the case of flirtation, flattery,
and expression of sexual and/or romantic interest.81 Once a person shows unresponsiveness to that interest, the attention
becomes objectively and subjectively unwelcome, and may transform into ridicule, shaming, and other forms of personal attack.82
When supervisors—as distinguished from coworkers—harass, the
sexual attention may be associated with threats of job-related
punishment or promises of job-related reward.83
A different kind of harassment involves no sexual attention
or interest at all. Instead, the harassment may involve genderbased belittling or denigration.84 This form of harassment, analogous to race-based harassment,85 is also emotionally debilitating
and destructive of employment opportunity. Whether sexual in
content or not, sex-based harassment operates to reinforce
socially defined gender stereotypes and roles.86
As the narrative below explains, all claims of sexual harassment on the job take one of two legal forms—they either (1) lead
79. MACKINNON, supra note 16, at 158–59.
80. Nicole Spector, The Hidden Health Effects of Sexual Harassment, NBC (Oct. 13,
2017, 11:14 AM), https://www.nbcnews.com/better/health/hidden-health-effects-sexualharassment-ncna810416 [https://perma.cc/LZS5-X3K2].
81. Marie Jackson, When Does Flirting Become Sexual Harassment?, BBC (Oct. 19,
2017), https://www.bbc.com/news/uk-41665049 [https://perma.cc/8J5J-PSFY].
82. MACKINNON, supra note 16, at 33.
83. Id.
84. LINDEMANN & KADUE, supra note 13, at 16 (“In one common situation . . . women
employees experience . . . scorn, ridicule, and verbal abuse from males who resent their
presence.”).
85. Id. at 3–4 (citing Rogers v. EEOC, 454 F.2d 234 (5th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 400
U.S. 957 (1972)). The Supreme Court approvingly cited Rogers in its germinal decision
on sexual harassment. See Meritor Sav. Bank, FSB v. Vinson et al., 477 U.S. 57, 65–66
(1986) (“Title VII affords employees the right to work in an environment free from
discriminatory intimidation, ridicule, and insult.”).
86. For elaboration of these themes, see generally Katherine M. Franke, What’s
Wrong with Sexual Harassment?, 49 STAN. L. REV. 691, 696 (1997); Vicki Schultz,
Reconceptualizing Sexual Harassment, 107 YALE L.J. 1683, 1687 (1998). This perspective
suggests important questions about theologically grounded conceptions of gender roles.
See discussion infra Part IV.
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to some kind of adverse job action, such as dismissal, demotion,
unwanted transfer, denial of promotion, pay cut, etc.,87 or (2) create a persistent, hostile environment on the basis of sex.88 Some
cases involve both persistent, hostile environment and adverse
job action.89 When the law of sexual harassment meets the ministerial exception, however, the distinction between persistent, hostile environment and adverse job action takes center stage. As
Part III demonstrates, all adverse job action claims are barred by
the ministerial exception, while at least some persistent, hostile
environment claims are not.90
The Civil Rights Act of 1964 prohibits sex discrimination in
employment, but sexual harassment was not recognized as a form
of discrimination until several federal court decisions in the District of Columbia in the mid-1970s.91 Building on those decisions,
Professor MacKinnon authored her pioneering work on the subject.92 She identified two primary forms of harassment. These include quid pro quo harassment, in which a supervisor makes sexual demands on an employee and conditions continued employment and/or its benefits on compliance with those demands;93 and
hostile environment harassment, in which women are subject to
persistent insulting or degrading treatment that effectively alters
their conditions of employment.94
In 1980, the EEOC issued guidelines that built on these early
decisions and scholarship.95 The original guidelines, as summarized in the leading treatise on the subject, extended the concept
of harassment to include “a sexually hostile environment, involving no tangible job detriment,”96 as well as quid pro quo harass87. See cases collected in LINDEMANN & KADUE, supra note 13, at chap. 18.
88. Id. at chap. 19 and cases collected.
89. Eleventh Circuit Recognizes Retaliatory Hostile Work Environment Claim, ABA,
https://www.americanbar.org/newsletter/groups/labor_law/ll_flash/1208_aball_flash/le
l_flash_78-2012hostile.html [https://perma.cc/BH44-YR2N].
90. See infra Part III.
91. Both involved quid pro quo harassment. See generally Barnes v. Costle, 561 F.2d
983, 985 (D.C. Cir. 1977) (holding that threat of discharge of a woman for refusal to have
sex with supervisor violates Title VII); Williams v. Saxbe, 413 F. Supp. 654, 655–57
(D.D.C. 1976) (holding that refusal of promotion of woman for refusal to have sex with
supervisor violates Title VII), rev’d on other grounds, 587 F.2d 1240 (D.C. Cir. 1978).
92. MACKINNON, supra note 16, at vii.
93. Id. at 32–33.
94. Id. at 40.
95. LINDEMANN & KADUE, supra note 13, at 1-11 to 1-13.
96. Id. at 1–13 (citing various sections of 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11).
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ment. The guidelines offered the view that unwelcome sexual conduct is actionable when it “has the purpose or effect of unreasonably interfering with an individual’s work performance or creating an intimidating, hostile, or offensive working environment.”97
The foundational efforts in support of a theory of sexual harassment, as actionable under Title VII, bore fruit in Meritor Savings Bank, FSB v. Vinson.98 Mechelle Vinson allegedly had been
subjected by her supervisor to demands for sex, and she testified
that she had acceded to these demands on occasion.99 She also
asserted that the supervisor had harassed her both physically
and verbally over a period of several years.100 The supervisor denied all of these assertions.101 On appeal from a D.C. Circuit ruling in Vinson’s favor on several points, the Supreme Court
affirmed the Circuit in some respects while reversing and
remanding the case on a key question of employer liability for
sexual harassment.102 The Court agreed with the D.C. Circuit
that, (1) a plaintiff can demonstrate a violation of Title VII by
showing a hostile and abusive environment based on sex, even if
the employer has not taken an adverse job action against her;103
(2) that her acceding to sex voluntarily is not a defense if she can
show that the sexual attention from her supervisor was unwelcome, and that she acceded for fear of losing her job;104 and (3)
that vicarious employer liability in such a hostile environment
case was not automatic, but rather would turn on the relevant
“agency principles.”105 The case was remanded for identification
and application of those agency principles.106
Meritor Savings Bank was a breakthrough decision in several
respects. First, it affirmed the EEOC’s articulation of the concept
of a “pervasive, hostile environment” as actionable even in the

97. 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(a)(3). The sexual harassment guidelines built upon analogous
guidelines and concerns with respect to harassment based on race or national origin. See
LINDEMANN & KADUE, supra note 13, at 1-11 to 1-13.
98. 477 U.S. 57, 66 (1986).
99. Id. at 60.
100. Id.
101. Id. at 61.
102. Id. at 73.
103. Id. at 66.
104. Meritor Sav. Bank, 477 U.S. at 68.
105. Id. at 72.
106. Id. at 73.
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absence of economic detriment from an adverse job action.107 In
keeping with the importance of that distinction, the Court emphasized that standards of employer liability in adverse job action
cases would be different from pure hostile environment cases. In
the former, the employer’s legal responsibility for adverse job actions taken by its agents is vicarious and automatic.108 In
contrast, hostile environment cases present a different set of
questions of employer responsibility.109 As we will explain below,
this distinction and the law that has emerged from it are of crucial importance in the cases that are the primary concern of this
Article.
Seven years later, the Supreme Court offered further definition of the elements of a sexual harassment claim in Harris v.
Forklift Systems, Inc.110 Teresa Harris was a manager at Forklift
Systems, an equipment rental company.111 The record included
findings that her supervisor, the company President, “often insulted her because of her gender and often made her the target of
unwanted sexual innuendos.”112 The Court of Appeals had ruled
against her sexual harassment claim on the ground that she had
not demonstrated psychological injury from the mistreatment.113
In an opinion by Justice O’Connor, a unanimous Supreme Court
rejected the requirement of psychological injury.114 Instead, the
Court emphasized that a hostile environment is actionable if a
reasonable person would find the environment hostile and the
plaintiff herself experienced it that way.115 The opinion further
explained that:
whether an environment is “hostile” or “abusive” can be determined only by looking at all the circumstances. These may
include the frequency of the discriminatory conduct; its severity; whether it is physically threatening or humiliating, or a
mere offensive utterance; and whether it unreasonably interferes with an employee’s work performance. The effect on the
107.
108.
109.
110.
111.
112.
113.
114.
115.

Id. at 64.
Id. at 70–71.
Id. at 71–72.
510 U.S. 17, 22 (1993).
Id. at 19.
Id.
Id. at 20.
Id. at 23.
Id. at 21–22.
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employee’s psychological well-being is, of course, relevant to
determining whether the plaintiff actually found the environment abusive. But while psychological harm, like any other
relevant factor, may be taken into account, no single factor is
required.116

The Harris opinion thus reaffirmed the holding of Meritor
Savings Bank that pervasive hostile environments are actionable
as sex discrimination under Title VII, even in the absence of an
adverse job action. Moreover, it specified the considerations that
lawyers, the EEOC, and lower courts should apply in appraising
such claims—the frequency and severity of the discriminatory
conduct, understood both objectively (to a reasonable person) and
subjectively by the complainant.117
After Meritor Savings Bank and Harris, there remained crucial questions of employer liability for the pervasive, hostile environment form of sexual harassment.118 As the Court explained in
Meritor Savings Bank, employers face vicarious liability whenever harassment produces an adverse job action—the harasser
and/or his allies within the firm without question act with the company’s authority in taking actions that produce material detriment to the target.119 But Meritor Savings Bank had left open the
question of employer liability for a pervasive, hostile
environment.120 The Court had offered only the limited guidance
that such liability should depend on “agency principles,”121 and
Harris did not put such principles to any test, because the decision involved the company President, who clearly spoke for the
firm.122
That guidance expanded dramatically in Burlington Industries, Inc. v. Ellerth123 and Faragher v. City of Boca Raton,124 decided on the same day in 1998. In these companion decisions, the
116. Harris, 510 U.S. at 23.
117. Id. at 21–22.
118. Meritor Sav. Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 73 (1986).
119. Id. at 70–71.
120. See id. at 73.
121. Id. at 72.
122. Because Harris involved the company President, the case presented no issues of
vicarious liability. The President clearly spoke for the company. See Faragher v. City of
Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 789 (1998) (“[Harris] was indisputably within that class of an
employer organization’s officials who may be treated as the organization’s proxy.”).
123. 524 U.S. 742, 765 (1998).
124. 524 U.S. 775, 780 (1998).
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Court explained the content and operation of the relevant agency
principles in the context of claims of a pervasive hostile environment based on sex.125 Kimberly Ellerth had been employed by
Burlington Industries as a salesperson and had quit her job in the
wake of unwelcome sexual attention from her supervisor.126
Ellerth brought her claim under the rubric of hostile
environment, but the lower courts had identified a strain of quid
pro quo harassment in the facts, and the Seventh Circuit (sitting
en banc) had split widely on the relevant principles of employer
liability.127
In an opinion for seven Justices in Ellerth,128 Justice
Kennedy clarified that the concept of quid pro quo harassment
was useful as a way of characterizing certain sex discrimination
claims, but was not dispositive on the relevant standard of employer liability. When a supervisor carries out a threat to dismiss
or punish an employee who refuses sexual demands, the case involves an adverse job action for which the employer has vicarious
liability.129 When such a threat is not carried out, however, the
case involves a hostile environment, of which the quid pro quo
threat is perhaps only a part.130 In such cases, the question of em
125. Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 758–59; Faragher, 524 U.S. at 801–02.
126. Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 748.
127. Id. at 750–51.
128. Justice Thomas, joined by Justice Scalia, filed a dissenting opinion, asserting that
employer liability for hostile environment harassment should depend on proof of
employer negligence. Id. at 766–67 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
129. Id. at 760–61 (citing Meritor Savings Bank and “[e]very Federal Court of Appeals
to have considered the question . . . .”). The Court in Ellerth explained further:
When a supervisor makes a tangible employment decision, there is
assurance the injury could not have been inflicted absent the agency
relation. A tangible employment action in most cases inflicts direct economic
harm. As a general proposition, only a supervisor, or other person acting
with the authority of the company, can cause this sort of injury.
Id. at 761–62.
130. Id. at 753–54.
To the extent they illustrate the distinction between cases involving a
threat which is carried out and offensive conduct in general, the terms [quid
pro quo and hostile environment] are relevant when there is a threshold
question whether a plaintiff can prove discrimination in violation of Title
VII. When a plaintiff proves that a tangible employment action resulted
from a refusal to submit to a supervisor’s sexual demands, he or she
establishes that the employment decision itself constitutes a change in the
terms and conditions of employment that is actionable under Title VII. For
any sexual harassment preceding the employment decision to be actionable,
however, the conduct must be severe or pervasive. Because Ellerth’s claim
involves only unfulfilled threats, it should be categorized as a hostile work
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ployer liability is more complex.
The Court thus treated Ellerth as a hostile environment case,
which assimilated it completely with Faragher, a straightforward
hostile environment case involving a female lifeguard employed
by the City.131 Beth Ann Faragher had worked part-time over five
years as an ocean lifeguard.132 She and other female lifeguards
had been subjected to repeated unwanted touching and persistent
lewd comments by several of their on-site supervisors.133 Their
complaints to the senior on-site supervisor had not been passed
on to higher-up city officials or discussed with the offenders.134
Justice Souter wrote for the same seven-Justice majority in
Faragher.135 Unsurprisingly, on the question of employer liability
for a pervasive, hostile environment based on sex, the opinions in
Faragher and Ellerth presented a unified viewpoint on the relevant principles of agency.136 The Court began with the principle of
agency law that a “master is subject to liability for the torts of his
servants committed while acting in the scope of their
employment.”137 Because most sexual harassment of employees is
not in the service of the employer’s business,138 that principle does
not support employer liability. In hostile environment cases, liability may rest on employer negligence (as in the obvious case
where an employer hires a known serial harasser and gives him
supervisory authority over female employees).139 More typically,
however, as explained in both Faragher and Ellerth, the relevant
agency principle imposes liability when the harasser is “aided in
accomplishing the tort by the existence of the agency relation.”140
As Justice Souter notes in Faragher and Justice Kennedy
likewise in Ellerth, every act of supervisor harassment is aided by

environment claim which requires a showing of severe or pervasive conduct.
131. Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 780 (1998).
132. Id.
133. Id.
134. Id. at 782–83.
135. Justices Thomas and Scalia again dissented. Id. at 810–11 (Thomas, J.,
dissenting).
136. Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 764 (1998); Faragher, 524 U.S.
at 802.
137. Faragher, 524 U.S. at 793 (quoting Restatement of Agency, § 219(1)).
138. Id. at 793–94.
139. See id. at 789.
140. Id. at 801 (citing Restatement of Agency, § 219(2)(d)); Burlington Indus., Inc. v.
Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 758 (1998) (same).
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the agency relationship.141 The relationship provides the harasser
with a pool of supervisees, and a mantle of authority under which
he can threaten, belittle, humiliate, and proposition for sex any of
the employees under his watch.142 Both opinions thus recognize,
and discuss at considerable length, the tension between (1) the
principle of no vicarious liability for torts outside the scope of employment, and (2) a competing principle of employer liability for
all torts committed by supervisors against supervisees.143
Both opinions resolve this tension with the creation of an affirmative defense, designed to facilitate the policies of Title VII as
well as to reflect the relevant agency principles.144 Because this
move in the law of sexual harassment is central to our analysis in
Parts III–IV, it is worth quoting the entirety of the relevant passage from Faragher:
In order to accommodate the principle of vicarious liability for
harm caused by misuse of supervisory authority, as well as
Title VII’s equally basic policies of encouraging forethought by
employers and saving action by objecting employees, we adopt
the following holding in this case and in Burlington Industries, Inc. v. Ellerth, . . . also decided today. An employer is
subject to vicarious liability to a victimized employee for an
actionable hostile environment created by a supervisor with
immediate (or successively higher) authority over the
employee. When no tangible employment action is taken, a
defending employer may raise an affirmative defense to liability or damages, subject to proof by a preponderance of the evidence . . . . The defense comprises two necessary elements: (a)
that the employer exercised reasonable care to prevent and
correct promptly any sexually harassing behavior, and (b) that
the plaintiff employee unreasonably failed to take advantage of
any preventive or corrective opportunities provided by the employer or to avoid harm otherwise.145
141. Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 760; Faragher, 524 U.S. at 802.
142. Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 760.
143. See generally Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 748–55; Faragher, 524 U.S. at 793–805.
144. Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 765; Faragher, 524 U.S. at 807.
145. 524 U.S. at 807–08 (emphasis added) (citations omitted). Justice Souter added:
While proof that an employer had promulgated an antiharassment policy
with complaint procedure is not necessary in every instance as a matter of
law, the need for a stated policy suitable to the employment circumstances
may appropriately be addressed in any case when litigating the first
element of the defense. And while proof that an employee failed to fulfill the
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The affirmative defense reflects foundational tort law principles as well as the anti-discrimination concerns of Title VII.146
Through the first portion of the defense—that the employer exercise reasonable care both to prevent, and to correct promptly, any
sexually harassing behavior, the defense emphasizes the reduction of harm through precautions and amelioration.147 The availability of this defense creates strong incentives for employers to
announce specific policies against sexual harassment by coworkers or supervisors; to train employees in the meaning and significance of sexual harassment; to have in place mechanisms of quick
response to complaints; and to take swift action to discipline or
dismiss perpetrators of harassment.148
The requirement of reasonable care does not, of course, mean
perfectly adequate steps to prevent and correct sexual
harassment. As one commentator has noted, in the wake of
Ellerth and Faragher the lower courts have been strongly inclined
to find that employers have satisfied the defense when their policies on paper measure up, even though the operation of the policies leave room for real doubt about their efficacy.149 One key concern about these complaint and correction policies is whether
they permit harassment victims to safely report the offense
through channels that do not involve the perpetrator.150 Fear of
reprisals will discourage the reporting necessary to make a corcorresponding obligation of reasonable care to avoid harm is not limited to
showing an unreasonable failure to use any complaint procedure provided
by the employer, a demonstration of such failure will normally suffice to
satisfy the employer’s burden under the second element of the defense. No
affirmative defense is available, however, when the supervisor’s harassment
culminates in a tangible employment action, such as discharge, demotion,
or undesirable reassignment.
Id. at 807–08. For a comparable excerpt from Ellerth, see 524 U.S. at 758–60.
146. Faragher, 524 U.S. at 806.
147. Id. at 807–08.
148. For a detailed development of the connection between the affirmative defense and
measures in the workplace that spur constructive engagement with role of women and
minorities in the work force, see Susan Sturm, Second Generation Employment
Discrimination: A Structural Approach, 101 COLUM. L. REV. 458, 482, 489–90 (2001).
149. See Anne Lawton, Operating in an Empirical Vacuum: The Ellerth & Faragher
Affirmative Defense, 13 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 197, 198 (2004); see also Lauren B.
Edelman et al., When Organizations Rule: Judicial Deference to Institutionalized
Employment Structures, 117 AMER. J. SOC. 888, 903 (2011).
150. Lisa Krupicka, 5 Mistakes to Avoid in Implementing a Harassment Policy, HR
PROF. MAG., http://hrprofessionalsmagazine.com/5-mistakes-to-avoid-in-implementinga-harassment-policy [https://perma.cc/CQ3E-JSW5].
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rective policy effective.151
The second step in the Ellerth-Faragher defense—that the
plaintiff-employee unreasonably failed to take advantage of any
preventive or corrective opportunities provided by the employer
or to avoid harm otherwise—is an application of the basic tort law
principle that potential victims should take reasonable steps to
avoid or minimize harm.152 As with step one, however, the notion
of reasonableness is doing substantial work.153 As noted above,
fear of reprisal may be a significant impediment to reporting harassment.154 Although step two, as part of an affirmative defense,
appears to place the burden of proof on an employer on the question of “unreasonab[e] fail[ure] to take advantage of any preventive or corrective opportunities provided by the employer,” in operation this step is likely to put the burden on an employee to
explain exactly why she did not pursue those opportunities—that
is, if the employer’s response mechanisms are found to be reasonable, failure to pursue them will appear presumptively unreasonable.155 In particular, courts will sometimes find a delay in reporting harassment, however understandable from the victim’s perspective in light of discomfort and fear of reprisal, to constitute
unreasonable failure to take advantage of corrective mechanisms.156
Judicial evaluation of the reasonableness of employer processes raises significant constitutional questions in the analysis
of potential liability of religious organizations in Parts III–IV.
The law of remedies for sexual harassment also plays an important part in the issues we analyze in the remainder of the article.
The remedial law under Title VII includes compensatory damages, punitive damages in appropriate cases, and the equitable
remedy of reinstatement in some cases of wrongful dismissal.157
When #MeToo meets the ministerial exception, reinstatement is
constitutionally barred, as is front pay as a remedy in lieu of rein151. Lawton, supra note 149, at 257.
152. Id. at 261.
153. Id. at 257.
154. Id.
155. Id. at 242–57.
156. Id. at 253–54 (citing cases).
157. The statutory provisions and case law that undergird the remedial regime in
harassment cases are succinctly summarized in LINDEMANN & KADUE, supra note 13, at
33-1 to 33-37.
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statement.158 As we will explain, compensatory damages may be
available in cases of a pervasive hostile environment, as are punitive damages in appropriate cases.159 Because claims for punitive
damages are subject to a defense that the employer has made
“good faith efforts to enforce an antidiscrimination policy,”160 the
constitutional questions raised by judicial evaluation of the personnel policies and practices of religious entities may at this
stage, too, be put into play.
III. #METOO MEETS THE MINISTERIAL EXCEPTION
The collision between harassment claims and the ministerial
exception took some time to develop. Courts first applied the ministerial exception to anti-discrimination law in McClure v. Salvation Army161 (1972), a ruling based on statutory grounds. At that
time, the theory of sexual harassment as discrimination had not
yet appeared in the law or commentary respecting Title VII.162
Rayburn v. General Conference of Seventh-Day Adventists163
(1985) represents the first square holding that the Religion
Clauses of the First Amendment require a ministerial exception
from non-discrimination law.
Over the next twenty years, state and federal courts decided
a quartet of cases in which sexual harassment law collided with
assertions of the ministerial exception.164 As the analysis below
reveals, the first and fourth in the quartet both involve female
assistant pastors who complained about sexual harassment by
their immediate supervisor, a male pastor.165 The second and
158. Id. at 33-17.
159. See infra Part IV.
160. Kolstad v. Am. Dental Ass’n, 527 U.S. 526, 546 (1999). Kolstad appeared just one
year after the decisions in Ellerth and Faragher.
161. See generally 460 F.2d 553, 560 (5th Cir. 1972) (construing Title VII of the 1964
Civil Rights Act to exclude religious bodies, hiring for positions of religious significance,
from the statutory prohibition on gender discrimination).
162. S e e
The
History
of
Sexual
Harassment
Law,
NOLO,
https://www.employmentlawfirms.com/resources/employment/workplace-safety-andhealth/sexual-harassment-law.htm [https://perma.cc/E4MG-JTLT] (explaining that
sexual harassment was not recognized by the Supreme Court as a form of sex
discrimination until the 1980s).
163. See 772 F.2d 1164, 1165, 1168–69 (4th Cir. 1985).
164. See discussion infra Part III.
165. See Elvig v. Calvin Presbyterian Church, 375 F.3d 951, 953–54 (9th Cir. 2004);
Black v. Snyder, 471 N.W.2d 715, 717–18 (Minn. Ct. App. 1991).
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third were decided close in time to one another, and both involved
claims by a male student for the priesthood that he was sexually
harassed by male supervisors in a Catholic seminary.166 The last
three in this quartet were decided soon after the Supreme Court’s
creation of an affirmative defense to hostile environment claims
in Ellerth-Faragher.167
A. The Opening Round: Black v. Snyder
Black v. Snyder168 was the first appellate decision to find that
the ministerial exception does not bar a sexual harassment claim
by a member of the clergy.169 In 1989, Susan Black was hired as
Associate Pastor at St. John’s Lutheran Church170 in a suburb of
Minneapolis. While still working at St. John’s in April 1990,
Black filed a discrimination charge with the state Department of
Human Rights against her supervisor, Pastor William Snyder.171
Black alleged that Snyder had made unwelcome sexual advances,
including (1) unwanted physical and sexual contact; (2) remarks
by Snyder to third parties that he and Black were “lovers”; and
(3) demands from Snyder that Black engage in companionship
with him outside the workplace.172 Before complaining to the
state agency, Black told members of the St. John’s Church council, the relevant church personnel committees, and representatives of the regional Lutheran Synod of her complaints against
Snyder.173 The congregation and synod investigated but took no
action.174
In the summer of 1990, the St. John’s congregation voted to
dismiss Black.175 She then sued the congregation, synod, and
Snyder on a variety of state law claims, including breach of con166. See McKelvey v. Pierce, 800 A.2d 840, 842, 853–54 (N.J. 2002).
167. See Ellerth v. Burlington Indus., Inc., 524 U.S. 742, 745 (1998). Ellerth was
decided in 1998, Bollard was decided in 1999, McKelvey was decided in 2002, and Elvig
was decided in 2003.
168. See generally 471 N.W.2d at 715.
169. Id. at 717.
170. St. John’s Lutheran Church is a congregation of the Evangelical Lutheran
Church in America. Id. at 717.
171. Id. at 717–18.
172. Id.
173. See id. at 718.
174. The report of the allegations, church response, and procedural posture can be
found in Black, 471 N.W.2d at 718.
175. Id. at 717–18.
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tract, retaliation, wrongful termination, and sexual harassment
in employment.176 The lower court dismissed all the claims
against the institutional defendants on First Amendment
grounds.177
On appeal, the Minnesota Court of Appeals reversed with
respect to the sexual harassment claim alone.178 Noting the U.S.
Supreme Court’s then-recent decision in Employment Division v.
Smith,179 the Minnesota court rejected the church’s free exercise
argument, because the state laws on which Black’s claims rested
were generally applicable to employers, without regard to their
religious character.180
The court took far more seriously the church’s Establishment
Clause-based argument that adjudicating Black’s claims would
lead to excessive entanglement between the church and the
state.181 As the court summarized the relevant principle, “[w]hen
claims involve ‘core’ questions of church discipline and internal
governance, . . . the inevitable danger of governmental entanglement precludes judicial review.”182 Applying this principle, the
Court concluded that most of Black’s claims against the Church,
including defamation, wrongful discharge, and retaliation for filing a complaint with a government agency, would “require a . . .
review of the church’s reasons for discharging Black, an essentially ecclesiastical concern.”183 Accordingly, the Establishment
Clause barred those claims.184
In sharp contrast, however, the Minnesota appellate court
noted that Black’s claim of sex discrimination based on persistent, unwelcome sexual attention was based on predischarge conduct and was “unrelated to pastoral qualifications or issues of
church doctrine.”185 Moreover, Black sought money damages only,
and was not asking for an order of reinstatement to her posi176. Id. at 718.
177. Id.
178. Id. at 721.
179. Id. at 719 (citing Emp’t Div. Dep’t of Human Res. of Or. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872
(1990)).
180. Black, 471 N.W.2d at 719.
181. See id. at 718–20.
182. Id. at 720 (citing Serbian E. Orthodox Diocese v. Milivojevich, 426 U.S. 696, 717,
721 (1976)).
183. Id. at 720.
184. See id.
185. Id. at 721.
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tion.186 Accordingly, the court remanded the case to allow Ms.
Black to proceed against the church with her hostile environment
claim.187
In his dissent, Judge Randall highlighted an issue that would
later become central to the tension in sexual harassment cases
against religious organizations.188 In this dispute, he wrote, both
the congregation and the synod had investigated Black’s harassment claim and had decided not to exercise their powers of supervision and discipline.189 Letting the case proceed would thus interfere with the church’s freedom to decide whether to continue
Snyder’s service at St. John’s, and if so, whether to transfer or
dismiss Black.190 “[W]e are restrained,” he concluded, “by the establishment clause from interjecting government oversight into
the ecclesiastical decision process on whether to discipline or remove a pastoral member.”191
Black v. Snyder foreshadows perfectly the key issues in later
cases involving sexual harassment claims by clergy.192 The opinion addresses the distinction between free exercise approaches
(barely relevant) and establishment clause-based entanglement
concerns (central); the distinction between adjudicating the
wrongfulness of the discharge (forbidden) versus adjudicating the
wrongfulness of the hostile environment (allowed); the distinction
between equitable remedies like reinstatement or substitutes for
it (forbidden) and damage remedies for the past harms imposed
by the hostile environment (allowed); and the permissibility of
judging the legal adequacy of corrective mechanisms within the
religious organization.193 The rest of the decisions in this quartet
play out those themes.194

186. Black, 421 N.W.2d at 721.
187. Id. (citing cases allowing enforcement against religious entities of laws
concerning the abuse of children and the regulation of buildings). The court also rejected
the Church’s state constitutional claim. Minnesota has a proexemption regime of
religious liberty, but the Church’s own antiharassment policy undermined any claim that
the harassment lawsuit burdened the Church’s exercise of religion. Id.
188. Id. at 721–23 (Randall, J., dissenting).
189. Id. at 722.
190. Id. at 723.
191. Black, 421 N.W.2d at 723. The majority in Black did not directly answer this
assertion.
192. See discussion infra Part III.B.
193. See Black, 471 N.W.2d at 718–21.
194. See discussion supra Part III; infra Part III.B.
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B. The Seminary Cases: Bollard v. California Province of the
Society of Jesus and McKelvey v. Pierce
Bollard v. California Province of the Society of Jesus195 and
McKelvey v. Pierce196 involved former seminarians (in both cases
male) who had prepared for the Catholic priesthood over eight
years and had abandoned their efforts shortly before the time of
ordination. Decided just two years apart, the decisions present
what McKelvey described as “striking[] similar[ities]” in both the
facts and the constitutional defenses offered by the defendant
religious institutions.197 Both followed the trail blazed by Black v.
Snyder, and recognized that compensatory damage claims for a
sexually hostile environment are not barred by the First Amendment.198
John Bollard became a Jesuit novice in 1988.199 He spent four
years at a Jesuit high school,200 and the next four years at the
Jesuit School of Theology in Berkeley, California. His complaint
alleged that beginning in 1990, and continuing through 1996,
various [Jesuit] superiors at these two institutions sent him
pornographic material, made unwelcome sexual advances, and
engaged him in inappropriate and unwelcome sexual discussions. Between mid-1995 and 1996, Bollard reported the harassment to superiors within the Jesuit order, but, so far as he
knows, his reports prompted no corrective action. He alleges
that the harassing conduct was so severe that he was forced to
leave the Jesuit order in December 1996 before taking vows to
become a priest.201
195. See 196 F.3d 940, 944 (9th Cir. 1999).
196. See 800 A.2d 840, 844–45 (N.J. 2002).
197. See McKelvey, 800 A.2d at 853–54. For a set of thoughtful suggestions concerning
the reform of Catholic seminaries, see The Rev. Thomas V. Berg, Want to Address Priest
Sexual Abuse? The Catholic Church Needs to Overhaul its Seminaries., WASH. POST,
(Oct. 18, 2018), https://www.washingtonpost.com/religion/2018/10/18/wantaddress-priest-sex-abuse-catholic-church-needs-overhaul-itsseminaries/?utm_term=.ba51fe708c4f [https://perma.cc/2NW5-XEYJ].
198. See Bollard, 196 F.3d at 944; McKelvey, 800 A.2d at 842, 858.
199. Bollard, 196 F.3d at 944.
200. St. Ignatius College Preparatory School, see id. at 944. Governor Jerry Brown is
an alumnus. See also Keeping in Touch, ST. IGNATIUS COLL. PREPARATORY (Apr. 17,
2015), https://www.siprep.org/alumni/genesis-magazine/genesis/keeping-intouch/~board/keeping-in-touch/post/keeping-in-touch-spring-2015
[https://perma.cc/WA9R-GJXZ].
201. Bollard, 196 F.3d at 944.
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Bollard filed federal and state administrative complaints,
and eventually filed suit in federal court, where he brought
claims against the California Province of the Society of Jesus
(“the Jesuit Order”) under Title VII as well as various state law
theories.202 The district court dismissed the suit on the ground
that it was barred by the ministerial exception.203 On appeal,
Judge Fletcher’s opinion for the panel reversed in part, and remanded in light of its conclusion that the First Amendment does
not bar claims for damages based on a hostile environment.204
The opinion analyzed what it perceived as the Free Exercise
and Establishment Clause components of the ministerial exception.205 Unlike the Minnesota Court of Appeals in Black v. Snyder,
the Ninth Circuit panel did not treat Employment Division v.
Smith as having erased the doctrine of free exercise exemptions
in this context.206 Judge Fletcher, invoking the balancing test of
Sherbert v. Verner, treated the Supreme Court’s line of cases on
church authority over personnel as consistent with a doctrine of
free exercise balancing.207 For several reasons, however, he found
the Jesuit Order’s arguments wanting. First, the suit did not interfere with the Order’s choice of priests.208 The Order wanted
Bollard to remain, and he left of his own volition because of the
harassment.209 Second, the Order did not embrace sexual harassment of seminarians as a method of training, nor did they justify
on religious grounds their disciplinary inaction in response to Bollard’s complaints.210 Accordingly, the Jesuit Order’s exercise of
religion was not burdened by allowing civil actions in response to
hostile environment harassment and the Free Exercise Clause,

202. Id.
203. Id.
204. Id. at 950–51.
205. Id. at 945–47.
206. Compare Black v. Snyder, 471 N.W.2d 715, 719 (Minn. Ct. App. 1991) (citing
Emp’t Div. Dep’t of Human Res. of Or. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 872 (1990)), with Bollard,
196 F.3d at 947.
207. Bollard, 196 F.3d at 946, 948 (citing Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U. S. 398, 403–07
(1963)). Hosanna-Tabor later clarified that the interest balancing mode of analysis under
the free exercise clause is inapposite in ministerial exception cases. See Lupu & Tuttle,
The Mystery of Unanimity, supra note 4, at 1278.
208. Bollard, 196 F.3d at 947.
209. Id.
210. Id.
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thus, did not bar the lawsuit.211
Judge Fletcher then turned to the Establishment Clause justifications for the ministerial exception.212 His opinion focused on
the question of excessive entanglement between the state and a
religious institution, and he divided that question into substantive and procedural components.213 Judge Fletcher rejected the
argument that this case presented issues of substantive entanglement for precisely the same reason that he rejected the Jesuit Order’s free exercise claim—that is, because the litigation did not
implicate the Order’s freedom to choose its priests.214
In its turn to procedural entanglement, the opinion focused
on the central problems presented by the case. As the panel
noted, without a substantive conflict about Bollard’s fitness for
the priesthood, the remaining statutory questions were: whether
Bollard had been exposed to a severe and pervasive hostile environment, and whether the Order could satisfy the elements of the
Ellerth-Faragher affirmative defense.215 Both inquiries, the panel
concluded, involved secular judgments about the content of the
harassment and whether the Order had taken reasonable steps to
prevent and correct it.216
Moreover, Bollard was not seeking equitable Title VII remedies, including reinstatement or any form of judicial monitoring of
future employer conduct.217 Those remedies would unconstitutionally entangle the courts with a religious institution.218 Instead, he
sought only the remedy of money damages for prior wrongdoing.219 If he prevailed on the merits, courts could provide that
remedy without constitutional problems.220
211. Id. at 948.
212. Id.
213. Id. at 948–49.
214. Bollard, 196 F.3d at 948–49. That the Order’s free exercise and establishment
clause arguments coincided in this way foreshadowed Hosanna-Tabor’s analysis of the
ministerial exception, which involves both clauses operating together. See HosannaTabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & School v. EEOC, 565 U.S. 171, 184 (2012).
215. Bollard, 196 F.3d at 949.
216. Id. at 950. In addition, the district court could control discovery to avoid
constitutionally sensitive questions. Id.
217. Id.
218. Id.
219. Id.
220. Bollard, 196 F.3d at 950. The panel thus remanded the case, including Bollard’s
state law claims, for resolution in the district court. Id. at 950–51. To the best of our
knowledge, the case then settled, as did all the cases in the quartet we are discussing in
this Part. Religious institutions, like most others, do not want to have public trials

30

WM. & MARY J. RACE, GENDER & SOC. JUST.

[Vol. 25:000

Bollard very precisely extended the Black v. Snyder template—on substance, defenses, remedies, and the overarching
constitutional questions—into the context of harassment of seminarians in training for the clergy.221 Two years later, in McKelvey
v. Pierce,222 the New Jersey Supreme Court confronted a similar
dispute, and proceeded in quite the same way.
After being accepted in 1985 as a candidate for the priesthood by the Diocese of Camden (N.J.), Christopher McKelvey began an eight-year journey through St. Pius X Seminary (1985–89)
and St. Charles Borromeo Seminary (1989–93) near Philadelphia.223 McKelvey interned at various New Jersey parishes during
his years at St. Charles, but he dropped out of the program in
1993, before being ordained.224 Based on theories of contract and
tort, McKelvey sued the Diocese of Camden and various individual defendants.225 He alleged that the defendants and their employees “fostered, tolerated, permitted and encouraged inappropriate sexual conduct which included, but was not limited to, persistent and frequent demands whereby plaintiff was subjected
and exposed to unreasonable, unlawful, immoral homosexual and
other deviant discussions and/or contact.”226 The lower courts in
New Jersey dismissed McKelvey’s claims on the ground that they
required a constitutionally impermissible inquiry into the existence and content of an implied contract between McKelvey and
the Diocese.227
A unanimous New Jersey Supreme Court reversed.228 The
Court noted that “[t]he First Amendment clearly ‘bars government from involving itself in purely ecclesiastic[al] matters, infocused on the hostile sexual environment in their workplace.
221. See id. at 947–48.
222. See 800 A.2d 840, 853–54 (N.J. 2002).
223. Id. at 845.
224. Id. at 846.
225. Id. at 842.
226. Id. at 845. The opinion includes more detail about the persistent and hostile
environment, which McKelvey alleged was inconsistent with various representations
made by the Diocese about the atmosphere in an educational program aimed at training
priests who would take a vow of celibacy. Id. at 845–46. McKelvey might never have
brought this lawsuit but for a rather misguided letter from the Diocese, alerting him that
his withdrawal from the training program rendered McKelvey indebted to the Diocese
for over $69,000. See McKelvey, 800 A.2d at 846. At that point, he filed his suit, asserting
that the Diocese was in breach of an implied contract with him and that he therefore
owed nothing. Id.
227. Id. at 846–47.
228. Id. at 842.
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cluding . . . retention of . . . ministers.’”229 After a lengthy and
careful review of the leading decisions, including Bollard, under
both the Free Exercise Clause and the Establishment Clause,230
the Court synthesized the relevant legal principles.231 “Before barring a specific cause of action,” the court wrote:
a court first must analyze each element of every claim and
determine whether adjudication would require the court to
choose between ‘competing religious visions,’ or cause interference with a church’s administrative prerogatives, including its
core right to select, and govern the duties of, its ministers.232

The court must also examine the requested remedies to see if
they involve similar constitutional defects233:
If . . . the dispute can be resolved by the application of purely
neutral principles of law and without impermissible government intrusion (e.g., where the church offers no religiousbased justification for its actions and points to no internal
governance rights that would actually be affected), there is no
First Amendment shield to litigation.234

Applying these principles to McKelvey’s lawsuit against the
Diocese of Camden, the Court reversed and remanded the case for
further proceedings.235 It instructed the lower court to review
each claim—including implied contract, intentional infliction of
emotional distress, and breach of fiduciary duty—to see if adjudication would interfere with church administration or interpreta229. Id. at 847 (quoting Weaver v. African Methodist Episcopal Church, Inc., 54
S.W.3d 575, 580 (Mo. Ct. App. 2001)).
230. McKelvey, 800 A.2d at 847–56. The Diocese relied only on the Establishment
Clause, perhaps because church lawyers had learned from Bollard that Free Exercise
defenses were likely to be met with an inquiry into whether sexual harassment was an
intended part of the training of priests. The New Jersey Supreme Court also examined
what it referred to as the “church autonomy” doctrine and concluded that there is no
such doctrine independent of the more particular dictates of the Free Exercise and
Establishment Clauses. Id. at 850–51. For a more detailed discussion of why the law
recognizes no general concept of church autonomy, see Lupu & Tuttle, The Mystery of
Unanimity, supra note 4, at 1296–99.
231. McKelvey, 800 A.2d at 856.
232. Id. at 856.
233. Id.
234. Id.
235. Id. at 860.
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tion of religious principles, such as the meaning of a vow of celibacy.236 “McKelvey can attempt to prove that he was sexually harassed by defendants,” the Court wrote, “resulting in his leaving
the seminary before he could be considered for ordination.”237
McKelvey and Bollard, the two seminary cases in this quartet, thus line up perfectly on both facts and constitutional analysis.238 Both involve seminarians harassed by their supervisors,
leading to suits against religious entities.239 Both decisions reason
that religious entities have no blanket immunity from litigation
arising from a sexually hostile environment, whether the suit is
based on Title VII or a mix of state common law claims.240
Instead, church immunities must be evaluated in light of the relevant elements of the cause of action and the potential in each
case for interference with the selection of clergy or conflict with
religious teaching.241 Finally, both decisions echo Black v.
Snyder’s analysis of available remedies.242
C. Elvig v. Calvin Presbyterian Church
Elvig v. Calvin Presbyterian Church.243 Elvig, which factually
resembles Black v. Snyder, is the final and most provocative decision in this quartet.244 By the time the Ninth Circuit’s processes
in Elvig had concluded, several judges had expressed serious disagreement about the soundness of the harassment exception to
236. Id. at 858.
237. McKelvey, 800 A.2d at 858. McKelvey could not seek ordination as a remedy, but
he:
might, without offending First Amendment principles, seek money damages
for the benefit defendants received from his free or reduced cost labor as an
‘intern’ in various diocesan churches and, based on Auxiliary Bishop Schad’s
letter, seek an order prohibiting defendants from attempting to recoup the
$69,000 tuition, book and fee costs.
Id. at 859. This case did not arise under Title VII, probably because of the relevant
statute of limitations.
238. See Bollard v. Cal. Province of the Soc’y of Jesus, 196 F.3d 940, 944–45 (9th Cir.
1999); See also McKelvey, 800 A.2d at 853–54.
239. See supra note 238 and accompanying cases.
240. See id.
241. See id.
242. Compare Bollard, 196 F.3d at 950 and McKelvey, 800 A.2d at 856–57, with Black
v. Snyder, 471 N.W.2d 715, 721 (Minn. Ct. App. 1991) (holding that monetary damages
would not violate the ministerial exception).
243. See Elvig v. Calvin Presbyterian Church, 375 F.3d 951, 951 (9th Cir. 2004), reh’g
denied; 397 F.3d 790, 790 (9th Cir. 2005).
244. See Elvig, 375 F.3d at 953–54; Black, 471 N.W.2d at 717–18.
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the ministerial exception.245 Because the affirmative defense in
Ellerth and Faragher had emerged shortly before Elvig, the case
offered the Ninth Circuit an important opportunity to explore the
constitutional implications of that defense.246 Is it possible for
courts to evaluate the reasonableness of mechanisms for prevention and correction of harassment without intruding on the internal governance of a religious institution? Moreover, several
judges identified a potential constitutional problem if the alleged
harassment involved persistent discussion of religious attitudes
about sexual relationships and the role of women.247
The facts of Elvig appear to be simple. Monica McDowell
Elvig was an ordained Presbyterian minister.248 Calvin Presbyterian Church (located in a Seattle suburb) hired her as an Associate Pastor, a position in which she served from December 2000
until December 2001.249 Elvig’s complaint in federal district court
alleged the following: Senior Pastor William Ackles harassed her
sexually and created a hostile environment.250 When Elvig sought
assistance from church authorities, they investigated but did
nothing to stop the harassment.251 When Elvig complained in October 2001 to the EEOC, Ackles allegedly retaliated by stepping
up the harassment.252 In December 2001, the church first put her
on unpaid leave, and then terminated her employment.253 Later
that month, the Presbytery decided that she was not qualified to
seek employment as a Presbyterian minister anywhere in the
United States.254
245. See Elvig, 397 F.3d at 790.
246. See Elvig, 375 F.3d at 957.
247. Id. at 970 (Trott, J., dissenting).
248. Id. at 953.
249. Id.
250. Id. at 953–54. The particulars of the complaint are thin. As recited in the dissent
to the panel decision:
[t]he conduct claimed to be actionable involved winking, allegedly
undressing Elvig with his eyes, and other forms of unwelcome verbal
attention which she interpreted as harassing. Elvig did not succumb to Rev.
Ackles [sic] alleged harassment, and she has not offered any allegation that
somehow her job was in jeopardy if she did not do so.
Elvig, 375 F.3d at 971 (Trott, J., dissenting).
251. Id. at 953–54.
252. Id. at 954.
253. Id.
254. Id. (“The Presbytery subsequently notified Elvig that its Committee on Ministry
had decided against permitting Elvig to circulate her church resume, or ‘personal
information form,’ effectively preventing her from acquiring other pastoral employment
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Her complaint asserted violations of Title VII in the form of
sexual harassment and retaliatory harassment, as well as related
state law claims.255 She sought damages for the harassment as
well as equitable remedies, including an order granting her the
right to seek pastoral employment at other Presbyterian
churches.256 The district court dismissed the complaint as barred
by the ministerial exception.257
In an opinion for a divided panel of the Ninth Circuit, Judge
Fisher reversed with respect to the claims for damages arising
from a hostile environment and from retaliatory harassment.258
The opinion invokes Bollard and proceeds identically.259 The court
may not review any adverse job action taken by the church
against Elvig.260 Accordingly, the church’s decisions to suspend
her without pay, terminate her employment, and ultimately
strike her from the roster of Presbyterian ministers were all protected by the ministerial exception.261 In contrast, she may on remand attempt to prove that Pastor Ackles sexually harassed her,
and that the harassment increased in retaliation for her
complaints to church authorities and the EEOC.262 The court
ruled that her remedies must be limited to tort-type damages
arising from those past wrongs, and may not include reinstatement or any damages for lost pay after the date of termination.263
The most controversial elements of Elvig arise from the defenses the church may offer to harassment claims. First, the
church may assert that the harassment was a product of its religious teaching.264 Bollard said likewise, but Bollard involved homosexual harassment in a seminary, where an avowed
atmosphere of celibacy made such a defense completely
unlikely.265 The context of Elvig at least raised the possibility of

in any Presbyterian church in the United States.”).
255. Id.
256. Elvig, 375 F.3d at 954.
257. Id.
258. Id. at 953.
259. Id. at 955–57.
260. Id. at 962.
261. Id. at 958.
262. Elvig, 375 F.3d at 960.
263. Id. at 966–67.
264. Id. at 963.
265. Id. at 957 (citing Bollard v. Cal. Province of the Soc’y of Jesus, 196 F.3d 940,
949–50 (9th Cir. 1999)).
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some religious justification.266 Second, the church may assert the
Ellerth-Faragher affirmative defense that it had in place reasonable mechanisms to prevent and correct the harassment, and that
Pastor Elvig unreasonably failed to avail herself of those mechanisms.267 The inquiry into this defense, says the panel opinion,
must be limited to secular concerns.268
The possibility of judicial intrusion on the substance of religious teaching and on the internal governance of religious institutions, plays out in other opinions that make up the Elvig suit.269
Dissenting from the panel opinion,270 Judge Trott expressed his
concern that Bollard had been wrongly decided.271 The dissent
noted that Pastor Elvig had taken a vow to be “governed by our
Church’s polity, and to abide by its discipline.”272 Digging more
deeply than Judge Fisher into the record of proceedings in the
district court, Judge Trott described Elvig’s internal complaint,
and the responsive mechanisms provided by the Calvin Presbyterian Church and the Presbytery with which that congregation
was associated.273 These included a response team from within
the church, followed by the appointment of an Investigating Committee, all as prescribed by the Church’s Book of Order.274 The
final step in her review process involved a petition to the Permanent Judicial Commission of the Presbytery, which (after de novo
review) affirmed the decision of the church’s Investigating Committee to take no action against Pastor Ackles.275
This inquiry into Elvig’s pastoral vows and the church’s responsive mechanism led Judge Trott to conclude that the ministerial exception should bar all aspects of her sexual harassment
claims.276 Judge Trott noted that Elvig’s lawsuit was itself a
266. See id. at 963.
267. Id. at 957–58.
268. Elvig, 375 F.3d at 963.
269. See id. at 961 and accompanying cases.
270. Judge Gould concurred briefly in the panel opinion, but asserted that he did so
in light of Bollard, about which he entertained “misgivings.” Id. at 970 (Gould, J.,
concurring).
271. See id. (Trott, J., dissenting).
272. Id. (citing Book of Order, G-14.0405b.(5), in CONSTITUTION OF THE PRESBYTERIAN
CHURCH (U.S.A.) (Office Gen. Assembly 2017–2019)).
273. Id. at 970–72.
274. Elvig, 375 F.3d at 971–72.
275. Id. at 971. Judge Trott also wrote that the church had offered repeatedly to
mediate between Elvig and Ackles, but that Elvig had refused. Id. at 972.
276. See id. at 975.
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breach of her vows.277 And it would be impossible, he argued, for
courts to evaluate the secular reasonableness of the responsive
mechanisms.278 To him, the case presented deep risks of substantive and procedural entanglement between the court and the
church.279 Bollard, he wrote, was distinguishable because the
plaintiff was a novitiate and not an ordained priest, had not
taken his final vows to accept church discipline and order, and
been offered no internal procedure.280 If Bollard was not distinguishable, Trott concluded, it was wrong.281
The Church defendants petitioned for en banc review in the
Ninth Circuit.282 The Circuit denied the petition, but the denial
produced three dissents, representing the views of six judges.283
In the most prominent dissent, Judge Kleinfeld284 rejected the
distinction between adverse job action claims and hostile environment claims. Building on Judge Trott’s panel dissent, Kleinfeld
insisted that supervision of clergy was as important to the
church’s constitutional freedom as hiring and firing, and that adjudication of hostile environment claims could affect the structure
of ecclesiastical supervision.285 He argued that the constitution
277. Id.
278. Id. at 974–75.
279. Elvig, 375 F.3d at 974–75. In a separate action by Elvig against Ackles and the
institutional religious defendants, the state courts in Washington gave summary
judgment for the defendants on the ground that the case could not be adjudicated
without second-guessing church doctrine and governance. See Elvig v. Ackles, 98 P.3d
524, 525 (Wash. Ct. App. 2004). Although the issues in the state court proceeding were
similar, they involved state law claims and did not involve the Ellerth-Faragher
affirmative defense; moreover, the state proceeding had reached the summary judgment
stage, while the federal case had proceeded entirely on motions to dismiss, in which
allegations had to be taken as true. See id. at 525–26.
280. See Elvig, 375 F.3d at 980 (Trott, J., dissenting).
281. Id.
282. See Elvig v. Calvin Presbyterian Church, 397 F.3d 790, 790 (9th Cir. 2005).
283. Id.
284. Id. at 798–806 (Kleinfeld, J., dissenting).
285. Id. at 799. At least one post-Hosanna-Tabor decision seems to agree with Judge
Kleinfeld’s concerns. See Preece v. Covenant Presbyterian Church, No. 8:13CV188, 2015
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 52751, at *17–19 (D. Neb. Apr. 22, 2015) (holding that ministerial
employee may not bring Title VII claim for sexual harassment because judicial inquiry
into investigation of alleged conduct necessarily implicates ecclesiastical judgments).
Kleinfeld’s concerns are also reflected in the Missouri Supreme Court’s approach to
sexual misconduct claims against churches. See Gibson v. Brewer, 952 S.W.2d 239, 247
(Mo. 1997) (holding that plaintiff in tort action for failure to supervise clergy must prove
that the religious institution “intentionally” failed to provide appropriate supervision);
see also Weaver v. African Methodist Episcopal Church, Inc., 54 S.W.3d 575, 575 (Mo.
Ct. App. 2001) (applying Gibson to a claim of sexual abuse brought by a ministerial
employee).
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barred evaluation of internal church procedures offered to satisfy
the affirmative defense in hostile environment cases.286 Pastor
Elvig had taken vows to be bound by church procedures.287
Kleinfeld argued that courts should not aid the pastor’s attempt
to circumvent her vows.288 In addition, he wrote, many religions
teach particular views on sexuality and the role of women. Accordingly, the content of the harassment may have included condemnation of what Pastor Ackles saw as sinful conduct.289
Judges Fletcher and Kozinski filed concurrences in the denial
of rehearing.290 Both responded directly to the dissenters’
concerns. Judge Fletcher,291 who had authored Bollard, insisted
that Elvig was not materially different, and that both decisions
were correct. Both decisions had taken pains to confine the courts
to secular inquiries into harassment and affirmative defenses,
and to restrict remedies and discovery in light of the ministerial
exception.292 Judge Fletcher explained that hostile environment
cases are essentially tort suits about the injury from harassment
itself.293 The constitution does not bar tort suits against the negligent employers of clergy who sexually abuse minors; hostile sexual environment suits should be similarly allowed.294
Judge Kozinski’s concurrence elaborated on these themes.295
Judge Kleinfeld’s concern about potential interference with
church governance proves too much, Kozinski wrote.296 A sexual
harassment claim under Title VII by a non-minister, alleging ha286. See Elvig, 397 F.3d at 799 (Kleinfeld, J., dissenting). Two separate dissents were
filed. Judge Gould agreed in a separate dissent that the affirmative defenses were
constitutionally problematic in cases involving religious institutions as employers. Id.
at 806–07 (Gould, J., dissenting). In yet a third dissent, Judge Bea elaborated on that
theme, arguing that adjudication of the affirmative defense would require intrusive
discovery of prior cases within the church, inquiry into the composition of the
Investigating Committee, and the reasonableness of the Committee’s conclusion about
whether Ackles had harassed Elvig. Id. at 808–10 (Bea, J., dissenting).
287. Elvig, 375 F.3d at 970 (Trott, J., dissenting).
288. See Elvig 397 F.3d at 801 (Kleinfeld, J. dissenting).
289. Id. at 805. Nothing in the record supported this speculation.
290. Id. at 790 (Fletcher, J., concurring) (Kozinski, J., concurring).
291. See id. at 790–95 (Fletcher, J., concurring).
292. Id. at 791–92.
293. Id. at 790, 793.
294. Elvig, 397 F.3d at 792, 795.
295. Id. at 795–98 (Kozinski, J., concurring). We ignore here the colloquy, ultimately
more tiresome than clever, between Kozinski and Kleinfeld over the aptness of the
analogy to “Murder in the Cathedral.” Compare id. at 798 (Kleinfeld, J., dissenting), with
id. at 796–97 (Kozinski, J., concurring).
296. Id. at 798 (Kozinski, J., concurring).
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rassment by a minister, would frequently require inquiry into the
reasonableness of the church’s discipline and response mechanisms.297 Yet such a suit would not be barred by the ministerial
exception, because the plaintiff was not a minister.298
Since Elvig, one federal appellate court299 and one federal
district court300 have adopted the view, contrary to the quartet,
that the ministerial exception bars hostile sexual environment
lawsuits. The appellate opinion asserts, without analysis, that
Judge Kleinfeld’s concerns in Elvig are well-taken.301 The district
court similarly asserts, without explanation, that the harassment
claim is barred because it is “factually entwined” with other
claims in the litigation.302 Of course, the same could be said of
both Black and Elvig, so this concern alone cannot explain why
those decisions are wrong.
In all other cases we have found, the principles announced in
the quartet have been explicitly followed.303 Elvig thus represents
the last significant judicial engagement with the tension between
sexual harassment claims and the constitutionally based ministe297. Id. at 797.
298. Elvig, 397 F.3d at 797.
299. See Skrzypczak v. Roman Catholic Diocese, 611 F.3d 1238, 1244–46 (10th Cir.
2010). Ms. Skrzypczak was the Director of Religious Formation for the Diocese. Id. at
1240. The court ruled that her position was indeed ministerial, and that the Constitution
barred her claims for age and sex discrimination. Id. at 1244–46. The causes of action
included an assertion of hostile environment, though the court mentions no details of
that claim. Id. at 1244. Without engaging the issues that separate the judges in the
Ninth Circuit, the Tenth Circuit panel cast its lot with Judge Kleinfeld’s Elvig opinion,
in which he dissented from the denial of rehearing en banc. Id. at 1244–45.
300. See Preece v. Covenant Presbyterian Church, No. 8:13CV188, 2015 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 52751, at *17–19 (D. Neb. Apr. 22, 2015) (holding that a ministerial employee
may not bring a Title VII claim for sexual harassment because judicial inquiry into
investigation of alleged conduct necessarily implicates ecclesiastical judgments).
301. See Skrzypczak, 611 F.3d at 1244–45.
We are . . . persuaded that [the Bollard-Elvig] . . . approach could, as Judge
Kleinfeld argued . . . , infringe on a church’s ‘right to select, manage, and
discipline [its] clergy free from government control and scrutiny’ by
influencing it to employ ministers that lower its exposure to liability rather
than those that best ‘further [its] religious objective[s].’
Id. at 1245 (quoting Elvig v. Calvin Presbyterian Church, 397 F.3d 790, 803–04 (9th Cir.
2005) . The argument proves far too much. The imposition of liability for negligent hiring
of clergy who abuse minors produces the same effect.
302. Preece, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 52751, at *19.
303. See Demkovich v. St. Andrew the Apostle Parish, 2018 U.S. Dist. Lexis 168584,
at *13–*18 (N.D. Ill., Sept. 30, 2018); Bohnert v. Roman Catholic Archbishop of S.F. , 136
F. Supp. 3d 1094, 1114–16 (N.D. Cal. 2015); Dolquist v. Heartland Presbytery, 342 F.
Supp. 2d 996, 1003–07 (D. Kan. 2004); Prince of Peace Lutheran Church v. Linklater,
28 A.3d 1171, 1176, 1184–85, 1192 (Md. 2011), cert. denied, 566 U.S. 937 (2012).
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rial exception. The clashing opinions in Elvig throw into sharp
relief all of the issues raised by that tension, and Hosanna-Tabor
invites a fresh look at them. The #MeToo moment seems a most
appropriate time to take that look.
IV. RECONCILING THE LAW OF SEXUAL HARASSMENT WITH THE
MINISTERIAL EXCEPTION
As noted in Part I, our long-standing defense of the ministerial exception rests on the constitutional impermissibility of adjudication of ecclesiastical questions.304 We reject any wider claim of
church autonomy. The principles enunciated in the controlling
opinions in the hostile environment quartet fit perfectly with our
account. The constitutional concerns raised in some of the
dissenting opinions in the quartet, however, deserve deeper exploration.
The issues highlighted in the quartet include (1) whether, for
purposes of the ministerial exception, adverse job action claims
are constitutionally different from those involving severe and pervasive hostile environments; (2) whether a hostile environment
can be legally justified by religious teaching on matters of gender
or sexuality; (3) whether adjudication of the Ellerth-Faragher affirmative defense to hostile environment actions leads, at least in
some cases, to constitutionally forbidden entanglement with the
governance of religious institutions; (4) whether the scope of discovery must be limited in hostile environment cases against religious entities; and (5) whether remedies in hostile environment
cases against religious entities must be limited to tort-type damages arising from the harassment itself.305 We consider these in
turn.
A. The Distinction Between Adverse Job Action Claims and Hostile Environment Claims
In agreement with the quartet, we believe that the distinction between claims of adverse job action and claims of a hostile

304. See Lupu & Tuttle, The Mystery of Unanimity, supra note 4, at 1280–84.
305. See Elvig v. Calvin Presbyterian Church, 397 F.3d 790, 791–93, 799, 805–08 (9th
Cir. 2005) (Kleinfeld, J., dissenting).
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environment is constitutionally necessary.306 It is useful to begin
the analysis by focusing on the harms from the varieties of sexual
harassment.307 Unwelcome and persistent sexual attention will
always be stressful, sometimes extremely so. In some
circumstances, that stress is aggravated by threats of violence,
emotional or physical.308
At work, if the unwanted attention is from a co-worker, the
target is captive to the stress, sometimes throughout the workday.309 If the harassment is from a supervisor, the stress is aggravated further by the danger of an adverse job action—dismissal,
denial or promotion, reduction in hours or pay, etc.310 When that
is added to the mix, the anxiety of unwanted sexual attention is
compounded by economic anxiety, which may extend beyond immediate job loss to the prospect of serious career derailment.311
306. Professor Levinson’s work concurs with the results in the quartet, but her work
takes Hosanna-Tabor as a starting point and advocates limiting it, without probing
deeply into its constitutional underpinnings. See Levinson, supra note 13, at 92, 119.
307. The #MeToo movement has produced an outpouring of impressive and powerful
writing by individuals about the harms of sexual harassment. See, e.g., Tom Bartlett &
Nell Gluckman, She Left Harvard. He Got to Stay, CHRON. HIGHER EDUC. (Feb. 27, 2018),
https://www.chronicle.com/interactives/harvard-harassment [https://perma.cc/GQX4WSFA]; Rebecca Carroll, My Experience at Charlie Rose Went Beyond Sexism, ESQUIRE
(Dec. 4, 2017), https://www.esquire.com/entertainment/tv/a13978884/charlie-rose-sexualharassment-accuser-story/ [https://perma.cc/NBA2-ACPK]; Lupita Nyong’o, Lupita
Nyong’o: Speaking Out About Harvey Weinstein, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 19, 2017),
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/10/19/opinion/lupita-nyongo-harvey-weinstein.html
[https://perma.cc/5QHT-JUK8]; Rebecca Solnit, Rebecca Solnit On the #MeToo Backlash:
Stop Telling Us How to Confront an Epidemic of Violence and Abuse, LITERARY HUB (Feb.
12, 2018), https://lithub.com/rebecca-solnit-on-the-metoo-backlash/
[https://perma.cc/VQN6-T8K7]; Jia Tolentino, How Men Like Harvey Weinstein Implicate
Their Victims in Their Acts, NEW YORKER (Oct. 11, 2017),
https://www.newyorker.com/culture/jia-tolentino/how-men-like-harvey-weinsteinimplicate-their-victims-in-their-acts [https://perma.cc/2TFN-Q77U]; Rebecca Traister,
This Moment Isn’t (Just) About Sex. It’s Really About Work, CUT (Dec. 10, 2017),
https://www.thecut.com/2017/12/rebecca-traister-this-moment-isnt-just-about-sex.html
[https://perma.cc/R9PV-PAWY].
308. See Bartlett & Gluckman, supra note 307.
309. See id.; see also Carroll, supra note 307.
310. See Traister, supra note 307.
311. The story of Judge Alex Kozinski’s former clerk, Heidi Bond, is a powerful
example. See Matt Zapotosky, Prominent Appeals Court Judge Alex Kozinski Accused of
Sexual Misconduct, WASH. POST (Dec. 8. 2017, 3:11 PM),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/prominent-appeals-court-judgealex-kozinski-accused-of-sexual-misconduct/2017/12/08/1763e2b8-d913-11e7-a8412066faf731ef_story.html?utm _term=.b2bb85cab423 [https://perma.cc/F5F7-ZVZ6]. For
a first-person account of Kozinski’s treatment of women, see Dahlia Lithwick, He Made
Us All Victims and Accomplices, SLATE (Dec. 13, 2017),
http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/jurisprudence/2017/12/judge_alex_ko
zinski_made_us_all_victims_and_accomplices.html [https://perma.cc/GD9A-HPLP]. For
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When the harassment takes the form of gender-based denigration, even without sexual content, the harms may be equally
severe. This kind of harassment is aimed at breaking the confidence and self-esteem of its targets, and can also do long-term
damage to the target’s psychological well-being and career.312
In a legal context without countervailing constitutional concerns, all of these harms from sexual harassment are fully cognizable and may lead to a complete set of legal remedies.313 Feminist critics of the ministerial exception quite understandably
point to this full set of harms.314 They argue that the exception
protects religious entities against appropriate imposition of liability, and thereby facilitates these harms to victims of discrimination, including harassment victims.315
As we have explained elsewhere, however, the critics have
rarely come to grips with the chasm at the center of their critique.316 Some faith traditions completely exclude women from the
ranks of clergy.317 Complete exclusion stigmatizes all women as
unworthy of these prestigious and socially significant positions,
robs them of the opportunity to compete and excel as ministers,
and denies the possible fulfillment associated with successful
ministry.318 In order to completely remedy the full set of harms
an eloquent comment on the type of career long harm suffered by Ms. Bond, see Amanda
Taub, The #MeToo Moment: How One Harasser Can Rob a Generation of Women, N.Y.
TIMES (Dec. 14, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/12/14/us/how-one-harasser-canrob-a-generation-of-women.html?_r=0 [https://perma.cc/8Q82-XXVJ].
312. See Schultz, supra note 86, at 1750–54 (illustrating how nonsexual gender-based
denigration impacts women’s feelings of competence in work and career advancement).
313. See Bollard v. Cal. Province of the Soc’y of Jesus, 196 F.3d 940, 949–50 (9th Cir.
1999) (noting how the remedies generally available under Title VII are not all available
under the ministerial exception).
314. See Lupu & Tuttle, The Mystery of Unanimity, supra note 4, at 1310.
315. Corbin, Above the Law, supra note 14, at 2015; Levinson, supra note 13, at
114–15.
316. Lupu & Tuttle, The Mystery of Unanimity, supra note 4, at 1310–14.
317. Similarly, some communities completely exclude openly LGBT persons from
ministerial positions. Where LGBT discrimination is prohibited, the ministerial
exception operates to nullify the prohibition as applied to such positions. As
demonstrated by Bollard and McKelvey, involving harassment of male seminary
students by males in supervisory positions, same sex harassment can be a form of
actionable sex discrimination. See Bollard v. Cal. Province of Soc’y of Jesus, 196 F.3d
940, 944 (9th Cir. 1999); McKelvey v. Pierce, 800 A.2d 840, 842 (N.J. 2002).
318. For a brief analysis of recent arguments for and against women being ordained
as Catholic priests, see Brooke Bobb, Keeping the Faith, VOGUE (May 4, 2018),
https://www.vogue.com/projects/13543313/roman-catholic-women-priest-movementgiulia-bianchi [https://perma.cc/F43U-7T38]; Delia Gallagher, Why Has the Pope Said
No to Women Priests?, CNN (Nov. 2, 2016, 11:22 AM),
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that gender discrimination may produce, courts would have to
eliminate the ministerial exception altogether. Those faiths with
overt, theologically grounded exclusion of women from ministry
would be effectively forced to open the ranks of clergy. Yet even
the most ardent opponents of the ministerial exception seem to
shrink at the prospect of this degree of coercion of faith communities.319
If the ministerial exception retains its legal status and
force—and a unanimous Supreme Court decision in 2012 makes
that extremely likely—, constitutionally sensitive decision-making must find the best way to reconcile it with the law of sexual
harassment.320 The principles reflected in the quartet represent a
good start in that direction.321 The baseline for measuring the adequacy of sexual harassment law in cases brought by clergy
should not be the law with the ministerial exception removed.
Rather, the baseline should be the otherwise robust scope of the
exception. So measured, the sexual harassment
exception—allowing for hostile environment claims—to the ministerial exception serves laudable purposes in a constitutionally
sound way.322
As Judge Fletcher suggested in Bollard, the harms of harassment fall into more than one traditional legal category.323 The
https://www.cnn.com/2016/11/02/europe/analysis-pope-female-priests/index.html
[https://perma.cc/M8XF-BRAG]; Judith Levitt, Women as Priests, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 29,
2012), https://www.nytimes.com/2012/09/30/opinion/sunday/women-as-priests.html
[https://perma.cc/AT83-JCFL].
319. Professor Corbin steers around the question. See Corbin, Above the Law, supra
note 14, at 2014, 2030–31. So does Professor Griffin. See Griffin, supra note 28, at
1016–17. We engage pointedly with this and other aspects of the anti-ministerial
exception position in Lupu & Tuttle, The Mystery of Unanimity, supra note 4, at
1283–84, 1310–14.
320. See Lupu & Tuttle, The Mystery of Unanimity, supra note 4, at 1287 (describing
how sexual harassment cases can still be constitutionally adjudicated in light of
Hosanna-Tabor).
321. See id. at 1291.
322. To be sure, barring adverse job action claims means that sexual harassment law
cannot fully achieve its laudable goal of combating gender stereotypes and reinforcement
of traditional gender roles. This is the price of the constitutional good of disabling the
state from policing the hiring of clergy, and we understand why some critics believe that
price is too high. Moral suasion and evolution of social norms may push faith
communities to work on their own, in the direction of ending gender discrimination, as
many have done.
323. See Bollard v. Cal. Province of the Soc’y of Jesus, 196 F.3d 940, 947, 950 (9th Cir.
1999) (noting the different types of remedies available for harms from sexual
harassment).
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harms of adverse job actions involve primarily lost opportunity.324
The principles and remedies of contract law seem most appropriate to dealing with such losses.325 In contrast, the harms arising
from a severe and pervasive hostile environment involve interests
in dignity, psychic well-being, and physical security typically protected by the law of torts.326
The appeal to tort law principles reflects long-standing constitutional norms about the limits of religious freedom.327 Religious communities are free to define their own criteria for ministry, in the same way that they are free to define the appropriate
recipients of their blessings and sacraments. But they are not
similarly free, without explicit consent, to act criminally or
tortiously in ways that violate the bodies, dignity, and psychic
well-being of their members and employees.328
This is the line that the decisions in the quartet have drawn,
reflected in the distinction between adverse employment action
claims—barred by the Religion Clauses of the First
Amendment—and hostile environment claims.329 It fits precisely
with our constitutional explication of the ministerial exception.330
We have argued our basic position at length elsewhere,331 but it
seems appropriate to reassert its basic premises.
Religious institutions are subject to law. When they act in
ways that are fully analogous to secular entities, they are subject
to regulation by the state. They must answer, as secular entities

324. See Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 761–62 (1998); Harris v.
Forklift Sys., 510 U.S. 17, 22 (1993).
325. See Bollard, 196 F.3d at 950 (suggesting that, while barred by the ministerial
exception, the appropriate causes of action for remedies such as reinstatement are state
contract law claims).
326. See Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 756 (analyzing Title VII liability through the lens of tort
law); Harris, 510 U.S. at 23 (noting the potential impacts of a hostile work environment
on an employee’s psychological well-being).
327. See Elvig v. Calvin Presbyterian Church, 397 F.3d 790, 795 (9th Cir. 2005)
(Fletcher, J., concurring).
328. See id. at 792–93.
329. See id. at 795 (delineating that a church’s decision to “hire, fire, promote, refuse
to promote, and prescribe the duties of its ministers” is protected under the ministerial
exception, while sexual harassment by a minister is not protected).
330. See Lupu & Tuttle, The Mystery of Unanimity, supra note 4, at 1280–84.
331. See LUPU & TUTTLE, SECULAR GOVERNMENT, supra note 53, at 43–45; Lupu &
Tuttle, Courts, Clergy, and Congregations, supra note 4, at 122–23; See also Ira C. Lupu
& Robert W. Tuttle, The Distinctive Place of Religious Entities in Our Constitutional
Order, 47 VILL. L. REV. 37, 92 (2002) [hereinafter Lupu & Tuttle, Distinctive Place]; Lupu
& Tuttle, The Mystery of Unanimity, supra note 4, at 1280–84.
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do, for torts committed by their agents.332
What appropriately separates church from state are the set
of activities and concerns that are religiously distinctive. Faith
communities develop principles about the relationship with a
transcendent order and practices associated with those principles.
In sharp contrast, our constitutional arrangements bar the government from promoting worship of a divine entity or teaching a
world-view that is explicitly grounded in theology.333
This cleavage between secular and sacred explains a great
deal of the law of the Religion Clauses in general, including a
long line of decisions about church property and ecclesiastical
personnel.334 The ministerial exception does not rest upon any
general immunity of religious employers from civil law governing
the employment relationship.335 These employers must comply
with wage and hour laws, workplace safety rules, and—in most
circumstances—prohibitions on employment discrimination based
on race, national origin, or sex.336 The ministerial exception applies only when such prohibitions conflict with the authority to
decide who is fit to communicate the faith.337
In the context of sexual harassment, the distinction between
adverse job action claims and hostile environment claims maps
perfectly onto the distinction between ecclesiastical questions and
secular questions. When religious entities transfer, demote, fire,
or otherwise alter the assignment of a minister, they are expressing an institutional view of whether that person is suited to a
particular clerical role. It is constitutionally irrelevant whether
the unsuitability is a product of substandard skills, inability to
get along with a sexually aggressive senior pastor, or some other
reason, rational or not. Of course, within a well functioning faith
332. See, e.g., Guinn v. Church of Christ of Collinsville, 775 P.2d 778–85 (Okla. 1989)
(holding that a church and its leaders may be held liable for defamatory statements
about a former member; any qualified privilege they may have held to speak in church
about the former member’s conduct ended when the member gave notice of withdrawal
from the church).
333. LUPU & TUTTLE, SECULAR GOVERNMENT, supra note 53, at 3–4.
334. See id. at 46–48. For examples of judicial abstention in cases involving strictly
ecclesiastical questions, see Serbian E. Orthodox Diocese v. Milivojevich, 426 U.S. 696,
724 (1976) (church personnel); Presbyterian Church v. Mary Elizabeth Blue Hull Mem’l
Presbyterian Church, 393 U.S. 440, 451–52 (1969) (church property).
335. See Lupu & Tuttle, Courts, Clergy, and Congregations, supra note 4, at 132.
336. See Elvig v. Calvin Presbyterian Church, 397 F.3d 790, 792 (9th Cir. 2005)
(Fletcher, J., concurring).
337. See Lupu & Tuttle, Courts, Clergy, and Congregations, supra note 4, at 132.
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community, complaints of sexual harassment and discrimination
will be taken seriously, and obnoxious behavior by supervising
clergy will be dealt with quickly and appropriately. However, the
state may not intervene in this supervision by reviewing a religious community’s decision about the hiring, firing, or
assignment of a minister.338
In contrast, the presence of a persistent hostile
environment—whether it affects clergy, lay employees, or both—
can be remedied through recognition of a right of action for the
environmental harms. This does not involve the state in dictating
the status of particular members of the clergy. It does involve imposing limits on mistreatment of employees, and corresponding
liability for the tortious harms that religious communities may
inflict on those within their employ.339
In an analogous context, courts have long recognized that
religious entities may be liable for negligent supervision of clergy
who abuse children or other vulnerable persons.340 Breaches of
that duty of care can lead to imposition of substantial damages,
both compensatory and punitive.341 Courts may not order the expulsion of persons from ministry,342 but they can and do impose
liability on religious employers that fail to protect victims from
misbehaving clergy.
B. May Religious Teaching Justify a Severe and Pervasive Hostile
Environment?
This is a question initially raised by Judge Fletcher in Bollard, when he suggested that religious doctrine may be relevant
to a sexual harassment suit. His opinion pointed out that:

338. Elvig, 397 F.3d at 795 (Fletcher, J., concurring).
339. See id. at 796 (Kozinski, J., concurring).
340. In Bollard, Judge Fletcher cites several of the leading decisions imposing such
liability. See Bollard v. Cal. Province of the Soc’y of Jesus, 196 F.3d 940, 948 (9th Cir.
1999). There are many more such decisions. See Lupu & Tuttle, Ecclesiastical Immunity,
supra note 1, at 1884.
341. See, e.g., Doe v. Archdiocese of Portland, 717 F. Supp. 2d 1120, 1140–41 (D. Or.
2010) (denying defendants’ motion to dismiss Jane Doe’s request for punitive damages,
finding that “a reasonable finder of fact could conclude on the basis of [] Jane’s
allegations that the archdiocesan defendants’ conduct met the appropriate standard for
award of punitive damages . . . .”).
342. Courts do not permit suits for negligent ordination. We cite the leading decisions
on this point in Lupu & Tuttle, Ecclesiastical Immunity, supra note 1, at 1846 n.224–27.
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The Jesuits do not offer a religious justification for the harassment Bollard alleges; indeed, they condemn it as inconsistent
with their values and beliefs. There is thus no danger that, by
allowing this suit to proceed, we will thrust the secular courts
into the constitutionally untenable position of passing judgment on questions of religious faith or doctrine. The Jesuits’
disavowal of the harassment also reassures us that application of Title VII in this context will have no significant impact
on their religious beliefs or doctrines.343

Along the same lines, Judge Kleinfeld’s Elvig opinion
asserted the possibility that pervasive and severe harassment
might, in some instances, be the product of religious teaching:
Suppose a minister in his daily morning prayer were to thank
God for making him a man and not a woman, as he would in
at least one religious tradition. . . . Or suppose a minister
takes the view, . . . that the Bible requires women to occupy a
subordinate position in the family, and that only men should
be permitted to preach. If he repeatedly, in his public prayers,
asks God to bring about such a world, and repeatedly tells his
female associate pastor that the Bible compels these views,
she will no doubt sense that the environment is hostile to her
work and denies her equality because of her sex. Yet the pastor (and his church) are entitled to the free exercise of religion
by spreading this view, which he and perhaps his sect understand to be God’s word. These opinions and prayers are political heresy. But in matters of religion, churches get to define
heresy, not the government.344

Judge Kleinfeld’s concerns are serious, but not nearly so well
taken as he thinks. First, cases in which the allegations of sexual
harassment involve the propagation of religious teaching are extremely rare.345 As the cases in the quartet reflect, the allegations
343. 196 F.3d at 947.
344. See 397 F.3d at 805 (Kleinfeld, J., dissenting).
345. See Lupu & Tuttle, Courts, Clergy, and Congregations, supra note 4, at 150
(analyzing why congregations would be reluctant to argue that sexual harassment
constitutes part of accepted religious teachings); see also Lupu & Tuttle, Ecclesiastical
Immunity, supra note 1, at 1818. To our knowledge, the sole harassment case in which
religious teachings have been offered as a defense is Demkovich v. St. Andrew the
Apostle Parish, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 168584 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 30, 2018), in which some
of the alleged harassment involved denigration within a Catholic parish of a music
minister’s upcoming same sex marriage. See id. at *3–*5, *25–*30. We discuss
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of harassment typically involve unwanted sexual
attention—staring, commenting, touching, propositioning, threatening, etc.346 It may be that this sort of sexualizing of the relationship between supervisor and the affected minister is a response to
the supervisor feeling threatened by the presence of women in the
clerical profession, but its outward manifestation is always sexual
and personal, not general and theological.347
Second, note that Judge Kleinfeld subtly slides “his church”
behind the harassing pastor’s sexist views.348 It is only in faith
communities that are open to female clergy however that such
faith-based harassment might occur. In those communities, the
harassing supervisor will be speaking for himself, not for his
faith’s current commitments.349 If he denigrates, even in theological terms, a female employee, the employer will be highly
unlikely to offer the defense of religious teaching.350 Intrachurch
impediments, rather than legal norms, will block the emergence
of such a defense.
No doubt, faith traditions that make a transition toward
openness to women or LGBT pastors may face a transition problem. Their male cadre of clergy or other religious leaders may be
uncomfortable with or even openly hostile to the change.351 In
those circumstances, the religious community may well have a
problem with discipline of those clergy or leaders who resist, subtly or otherwise, the church’s new teaching. In such cases, however, the conflict over religious teaching is between the harasser
and the church, not between the victim and the church. How faith
groups deal with dissenting leaders through periods of transition
Demkovich infra note 361.
346. See Elvig v. Calvin Prebysterian Church, 397 F.3d 790, 791 (9th Cir. 2005)
(Fletcher, J., concurring); Bollard, 196 F.3d at 944; McKelvey v. Pierce, 800 A.2d 840,
842 (N.J. 2002); Black v. Snyder, 471 N.W. 715, 717–18 (Minn. Ct. App. 1991).
347. For a discussion on why some men might be uncomfortable or threatened by
female clergy, see Jennie Rothenberg Gritz & Eleanor Barkhorn, Why Are People Still
Uncomfortable with Female Rabbis and Pastors?, ATLANTIC (Dec. 21, 2012),
https://www.theatlantic.com/sexes/archive/2012/12/why-are-people-still-uncomfortablewith-female-rabbis-and-pastors/266542/ [https://perma.cc/P9QL-XGGF].
348. Elvig, 397 F.3d at 805 (Kleinfeld, J., dissenting).
349. See Bollard, 196 F.3d at 947 (discussing that the Jesuits “condemn[ed] [the
harassment] as inconsistent with their values and beliefs”).
350. See id.
351. See Lupu & Tuttle, Courts, Clergy, and Congregations, supra note 4, at 129 n.65
(suggesting that “[i]n the case of those faiths that openly exclude females from roles in
the clergy . . . the impact on the tradition and experience of the faith” would be
significant and potentially difficult).
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is indeed a solely ecclesiastical matter.352 It is the concern of the
state only if these leaders behave abusively toward clergy (or others) under their supervision.353 If that kind of behavior develops,
the religious employer incurs legal responsibility to intervene and
faces liability if it fails to do so.354
If a faith community’s religious teaching ever included an
explicit and fully disclosed policy of persistent sexual attention by
leaders towards clergy under their supervision, the denomination
would have a straightforward and effective defense to a sexual
harassment suit.355 That defense would be consent—explicit, not
implied from general circumstances of discipline and control in
clergy employment.356 Becoming a minister in such a religious
group would mean the sexual attention was welcome.357 If the
attention becomes unwelcome, it is time to leave. And if the religious community coercively prevents exit, the law can indeed
remedy that through civil suit for false imprisonment, or criminal
complaint for kidnapping.358 The ministerial exception would bar
neither of those measures.359
One very recent decision concerning sexual harassment of
clergy does involve the interaction of religious teaching with a
pervasive hostile environment. Demkovich v. St. Andrew the
Apostle Parish,360 involves a suit by Sandor Demkovich against
352. See Elvig, 397 F.3d at 790–91 (Fletcher, J., concurring).
353. See Lupu & Tuttle, The Mystery of Unanimity, supra note 4, at 1290–91.
354. See Lupu & Tuttle, Ecclesiastical Immunity, supra note 1, at 1847–49 (analyzing
how some courts impose liability on religious institutions for negligent employment of
tortious ministers).
355. See Elvig, 397 F.3d at 805 (Kleinfeld, J., dissenting) (noting his lengthy example
of a minister whose church had misogynistic religious traditions).
356. See id. at 804–05.
357. It is far from clear whether employees should be free to consent to working in a
severe and hostile work environment. For arguments that women working in highly
sexualized occupations, such as strippers or prostitutes, should be protected from sexual
harassment notwithstanding their consent to such work, see Ann C. McGinley,
Harassment of Sex(y) Workers: Applying Title VII to Sexualized Industries, 18 YALE J.
L. & FEMINISM 65, 90–92 (2006). But see Lua Kamál Yuille, Sex in the Sexy Workplace,
9 NW. J. L. & SOC. POL’Y 88, 91 (2013) (arguing that some jobs in sexualized industries
may include certain forms of sexual harassment under the “bona fide occupational
qualification” standard).
358. See Molko v. Holy Spirit Ass’n, 762 P.2d 46, 57–58 (Cal. 1988) (explaining that
although plaintiffs’ own false imprisonment claims were constitutionally barred, the
court recognized that there were other instances in which false imprisonment claims
were successfully brought against religious figures).
359. See id.
360. 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 168584 (N.D. Ill., Sept. 30, 2018).
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the Parish, which had employed him as a music director, choir
director, and organist between 2012 and 2014.361 The original
complaint in the lawsuit alleged that Demkovich had been unlawfully terminated on account of his sex, sexual orientation, marital
status, and disability.362 The federal district court dismissed the
suit on the ground that Demkovich’s position fell under the ministerial exception.363
Demkovich then filed an amended complaint alleging that he
had been subjected to a pervasively hostile work environment on
the same grounds of sex, sexual orientation, marital status, and
disability.364 In particular, Demkovich alleged that his supervisor,
Reverend Jacek Dada, repeatedly and viciously harassed him
about being gay and about his upcoming wedding to his same sex
partner.365 Dada dismissed Demkovich from his position four days
after the wedding.366 In addition, the complaint further alleged
that Dada harassed Demkovich about his weight, which
Demkovich attributed to the disabling conditions of diabetes and
a metabolic problem.367
In an opinion that tracks the principles enunciated in the
quartet of cases in Part III, the district court dismissed the portion of the complaint pertaining to Demkovich’s sexual orientation but refused to dismiss the portion alleging a hostile work
environment based on disability.368 The court recognized that the
First Amendment does not presumptively bar a suit for damages
arising from a pervasively hostile work environment.369 Based on
the allegations in the complaint, however, the court found that
Reverend Dada’s harassment of Demkovich reflected Catholic
teaching with respect to his planned wedding, and thus was constitutionally protected.370 In contrast, the harassment with
respect to Demkovich’s weight did not reflect such teaching and
361. Id. at *3. The complaint also named the Archdiocese of Chicago as Demkovich’s
employer and a co-defendant. Id.
362. Id. at *1.
363. Id.
364. Id. at *2–3.
365. Demkovich, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 168584, at *3–5. According to the complaint,
Dada referred to Demkovich and his partner as “bitches,” id. at *3, and described the
planned wedding to other employees as a “fag wedding,” id. at *4.
366. Demkovich, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 168584, at *5.
367. Id. at *5–6.
368. Id. at *34.
369. See id. at *19–25.
370. See id. at *25–30.
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therefore was actionable.371
Demkovich presents a subtle question about a hostile work
environment that is defended by the employer on the ground that
it reflects an undisputed religious teaching. Reverend Dada, acting for the Parish, had several nonharassing options. Because
Demkovich was a ministerial employee, Dada could have lawfully
dismissed Demkovich as soon as Dada learned of the employee’s
plan to marry a same sex partner. Alternatively, Dada could have
chosen to retain Demkovich as a Music Director while encouraging him—in a respectful or loving way, rather than a harsh and
degrading way—to bring his conduct into conformity with church
teaching. But the existence of nonharassing options does not liberate the judiciary from the constitutional restriction on resolving
exclusively ecclesiastical questions. The appropriate way of communicating that religious teaching presents such a question. Attempting to draw a line between mild and severe methods of communication, or between officially approved methods and an
agent’s discretionary choice of methods, would involve courts in
impermissible questions concerning the transmission of religious
lessons within the church.372
Because the claim that religious teaching supports the hostile environment would be a defense to otherwise actionable harassment, the employer should have to assert that the employee
had violated the community’s religious principles. The employer
similarly should have to assert that the supervisor’s mode of expression of those principles was in keeping with the faith. These
requirements of accountability would validate the First Amendment defense without involving the court in a forbidden adjudication of the faith’s norms, or its means of communicating those
norms.
C. Consequences of the Distinction Between Adverse Job Action
Claims and Hostile Environment Claims

371. Id. at *30–31.
372. We think the court perceived an appropriate line between chastisement by speech
alone and that which involves physical assault or similar offenses. See id. at *18 (citing
Tomic v. Catholic Diocese of Peoria, 442 F.3d 1036, 1039–40 (7th Cir. 2006) (noting that
the “internal-affairs exception [to employment laws] is limited,” for instance, “[a] church
could not subject its clergy to corporal punishment or require them to commit criminal
acts.”)).
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By barring adverse job action claims while allowing hostile
environment claims in actions by clergy, our approach does have
one unfortunate consequence. In non-clergy cases, firing the complainant is an adverse job action that can give rise to a variety of
remedies, including punitive damages and orders of
reinstatement.373 Firing as a response to a harassment complaint
thus expands the potential liability of the employer, who may be
already facing the imposition of damages for the hostile environment.374 Moreover, the Ellerth-Faragher defense is not available
with respect to the harm caused by adverse job actions.375
In cases involving clergy, however, religious employers are
liable only for the harm done by the hostile environment, not for
the separate harms of any adverse job action.376 This partial immunity may give religious employers the incentive to dismiss a
complaining minister rather than retain the complainant and
attempt to resolve the conflict. Firing a clergy employee will cut
off the period for environmental damage assessment at the effective date of the firing, and will expose the employer to no additional liability.377
This is a tragic side effect of the operation of constitutional
norms. We might fix the situation by permitting all claims and
remedies for sexual harassment, which the Constitution forbids,
or by permitting none, which is a cure far worse than the disease.
Moreover, religious entities that welcome female clergy would be
highly unlikely to fire a complaining member of the clergy at the
moment she speaks out. She may be far more valuable than her
harasser. The religious entity may be deeply committed to finding
peaceful and productive means of internal dispute resolution. A
wise lawyer advising a religious entity in these circumstances
may flag the point about limiting damages without insisting that
this is the only or most sensible course. For example, in both
Black and Elvig, the respective churches investigated the complaints and tried to work with the female pastor until she took
373. See Bollard v. Cal. Province of the Soc’y of Jesus, 196 F.3d 940, 950 (9th Cir.
1999) (recognizing that the ministerial exception bars the “state law claim for breach of
contract with an associated remedy of reinstatement”).
374. See id.
375. See Elvig v. Calvin Presbyterian Church, 397 F.3d 790, 793 (9th Cir. 2005)
(Fletcher, J., concurring) (“[The Ellerth inquiry] is a restricted inquiry.”).
376. See id. at 796 (Kozinski, J., concurring).
377. See id.
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her complaint to a government agency.378
The employer’s institutional response to a hostile environment complaint is a matter of prudent employment relations. No
sensible employer wants to simply cut loose a professional employee in whom the institution has invested resources for education and training. Nor will a religious entity be eager to
explain—or lie—to worshippers about why a church leader has
suddenly disappeared from the pulpit.
Accordingly, maintaining employer liability for hostile environment claims, while immunizing religious employers against
liability for adverse job action claims, should incentivize the creation of policies and precautions against sexual harassment.379
These incentives are strongly reinforced, moreover, by the imposition of full liability for sexual harassment of non-ministerial employees.380
D. Applying the Ellerth-Faragher Affirmative Defense in Hostile
Environment Actions by Clergy
We think the most difficult questions about the sexual harassment exception arise from application of the Ellerth-Faragher
affirmative defense to religious bodies.381 This was the centerpiece
of the brief dissent in Black v. Snyder and of several opinions in
Elvig.382
Recall the Supreme Court’s formulation of the affirmative
defense, applicable to hostile environment claims alone:
378. See generally Elvig v. Calvin Presbyterian Church, 375 F.3d 951, 953–54 (9th Cir.
2004); Black v. Snyder, 471 N.W.2d 715, 718 (Minn. Ct. App. 1991). Hosanna-Tabor,
which involved disability rather than harassment, revealed a similar pattern, in which
negotiations broke off only when the plaintiff minister complained to a government
agency. Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & School v. EEOC, 565 U.S. 171,
180 (2012).
379. These policies should include protection of clergy from sexual harassment by lay
members of the congregation—including those who are not involved in governance of the
congregation or supervision of the affected cleric. In this respect, religious employers
should be subject to the same norms as other employers who are required to protect
employees against sexual harassment by customers. See, e.g., EEOC v. Love’s Travel
Stops & Country Stores, 677 F. Supp. 2d 1176, 1177 (D. Ariz. 2009); Menchaca v. Rose
Records, No. 94-C-1376, 1995 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4149, at *1 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 31, 1995);
Powell v. Las Vegas Hilton Corp., 841 F. Supp. 1024, 1025 (D. Nev. 1992).
380. Love’s Travel Stops, 677 F. Supp. 2d at 1185.
381. See Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 807 (1998).
382. See Black v. Snyder, 471 N.W.2d 715, 722 (Minn. Ct. App. 1991) (Randall, J.,
dissenting).
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When no tangible employment action is taken, a defending
employer may raise an affirmative defense to liability or damages, subject to proof by a preponderance of the evidence, . . . .
The defense comprises two necessary elements: (a) that the employer exercised reasonable care to prevent and correct
promptly any sexually harassing behavior, and (b) that the
plaintiff employee unreasonably failed to take advantage of
any preventive or corrective opportunities provided by the employer or to avoid harm otherwise.383

The defense has two prongs, and the first is likely to invite
assertions by religious employers that adjudication involves judicial second-guessing of the reasonableness of their steps “to prevent and correct . . . any sexually harassing behavior.”384 Let us
start with prevention. The most common steps that employers
take to prevent harassment are (1) development and articulation
of a policy about sexual harassment, including gender-based denigration and unwanted sexual attention in the workplace; (2)
training of employees in the purposes, operation, and meaning of
such a policy; and (3) taking care in the employment of supervisors.385 None of these steps are likely to invite judicial evaluation
of theological understandings. Of course, a religious denomination may express its concern about harassment of employees,
clergy included, in religious terms. With respect to policies and
training, we can imagine the deployment of language about respecting the dignity of the person, in addition to or instead of
more conventional phrasing about the physical and emotional
integrity of employees. All that matters for purposes of the defense, however, is that the policy and training be reasonable steps
to prevent the wrong.386 Preferring secular to religious
understandings of the wrong would raise a constitutional problem
of discrimination against religion.387 Employers, secular or religious, are required to provide good faith and effective communica383. Faragher, 524 U.S. at 807 (emphasis added).
384. Id.
385. See, e.g., U.S. EQUAL EMP’T OPPORTUNITY COMM’N, Best Practices for Employers
and Human Resources/EEO Professionals, https://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/initiatives/erace/bestpractices-employers.cfm [https://perma.cc/FRJ2-P8JK] [hereinafter EEOC Best
Practices].
386. Id.
387. Lupu & Tuttle, Ecclesiastical Immunity, supra note 1, at 1844.
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tion, in any terms that supervisors and other employees can reasonably understand.388
Prevention of harassment through diligence in selecting supervisors can be understood similarly. Religious organizations
understand that they risk liability if they fail to use reasonable
care in screening clergy who are (1) in a position to sexually
abuse vulnerable people; or (2) likely to ignore reports of workplace sexual harassment of those under their supervision.389 This
has manifested itself most substantially in cases of sexual abuse
of minors, but sexual harassment presents analogous risks. Of
course, it may be that ordinary practices of screening do not disclose a propensity to sexually harass or to be indifferent to such
harassment.390 Once complaints have been made and verified
against particular religious leaders, however, their employers will
be on notice of the risk.391 If employers return these supervisors to
a position from which they can continue the same conduct, employers will face the prospect that courts will find them to have
failed to use reasonable means of prevention.392
The overarching question in evaluating a religious entity’s
mechanisms for prevention and correction of sexual harassment
is whether they reasonably satisfy the specified secular goals.393
Compared to prevention, mechanisms for correction are more
complex to evaluate because (1) religious organizations are likely
to vary widely in their methods of investigation and discipline,
and (2) those methods are frequently tied to a faith group’s religious understanding of church order.394 Recall that in Black v.
Snyder and Elvig v. Calvin Presbyterian Church, dissenting
judges expressed concern that applying the affirmative defenses
to harassment cases would unconstitutionally entangle the courts
in the evaluation of church governance.395
In both Black and Elvig, the inquiries into the alleged
harassment were made initially by committees of the respective
388. See EEOC Best Practices, supra note 385.
389. See Lupu & Tuttle, Ecclesiastical Immunity, supra note 1, at 1848 n.234 and
accompanying cases.
390. Id. at 1795.
391. Id. at 1866.
392. Id. at 1843.
393. Id. at 1821.
394. Id. at 1854.
395. See supra notes 91–103, 121–41 and accompanying text.
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congregations, and—when those groups did not find
harassment—then on appeal to denominational bodies that governed a number of congregations in a particular geographic region.396 In more purely congregational arrangements, corrective
measures will be made only at the congregational level. In an interconnected or strictly hierarchical religious polity, the corrections are likely to be undertaken by an office that is organizationally upstream from the place of offense—for example, in a Roman
Catholic Diocese or a Methodist Conference.
It is impossible for us to evaluate the broad range of possibilities for corrective mechanisms across religious communities.
What we can confidently say, however, is that such mechanisms
must be measured by secular criteria of design and effectiveness.
The employer must find a safe way for employees, including
clergy, to report harassment. The line of reporting cannot begin
with the harasser himself, or with any other person who has obvious loyalties to the accused over the accuser. The fact-finding inquiry must provide the accuser a respectful and meaningful opportunity to be heard. And the response to any findings of harassment should include recommendations for correction, including
when appropriate the transfer of complainant or perpetrator to a
different position. The particular form of these steps is up to the
reasonable discretion of the employer. Corrective mechanisms in
religious organizations do not have to line up perfectly with their
counterparts in secular organizations.397
Judge Kleinfeld’s opinion in Elvig emphasizes that Pastor
Elvig “[had] vowed ‘to be governed by . . . [] Church’s polity, and
to abide by its discipline.’”398 No one disputes that. The question
396. See Black v. Snyder, 471 N.W.2d 715, 722 (Minn. Ct. App. 1991); Elvig v. Calvin
Presbyterian Church, 375 F.3d 951, 971 (9th Cir. 2004), reh’g denied, 397 F.3d 790 (9th
Cir. 2005).
397. As Judge Fletcher wrote in Bollard,
[The Ellerth inquiry] is a restricted inquiry. Nothing in the character of this
defense will require a jury to evaluate religious doctrine or the
“reasonableness” of the religious practices followed within the Jesuit order.
Instead, the jury must make secular judgments about the nature and
severity of the harassment and what measures, if any, were taken by the
Jesuits to prevent or correct it. The limited nature of the inquiry, combined
with the ability of the district court to control discovery, can prevent a wideranging intrusion into sensitive religious matters.
Bollard v. Cal. Province of the Soc’y of Jesus, 196 F.3d 940, 950 (9th Cir. 1999).
398. 397 F.3d at 801 (Kleinfeld, J., dissenting) (quoting Elvig, 375 F.3d at 970 n.9
(Trott, J., dissenting)).
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is the legal significance of such vows and commitments. With respect to her status as a pastor in the church, the scope of these
promises—and the consequence of their breach—present exclusively ecclesiastical questions.399 When, as a result of Ms. Elvig’s
complaint to the EEOC or her suit in civil court, leaders of the
Presbyterian Church chose to end Ms. Elvig’s ministerial eligibility, the Ninth Circuit panel correctly decided that it could not review that decision.400
The institutional consequences of her vows, however, can be
fully separated from their legal consequences. If a pastor had
been forcibly raped by a fellow church employee, the church could
not rely on the pastor’s vows to prevent her from making a criminal complaint or bringing a civil suit.401 That civil suit might
name the employer as a defendant if it had negligently hired or
supervised the perpetrator. The ministerial exception is designed
to protect a religious entity’s choice of minister, not to insulate it
from all legal consequences of that decision.402
The second prong of the Ellerth-Faragher affirmative defense
is whether the complainant unreasonably failed to avail herself of
corrective opportunities, or to otherwise avoid the harm.403 On
this question, religious organizations are no more likely than secular ones to be the locus of special problems.404 In any organization, the channels for complaint and correction must be accessible
and safe.405 Telling an assistant pastor that she may complain
only to her harasser is not sufficient.406 Such a procedure—in a
religious or secular entity—will seem dangerous and unreliable.
Of course, the smaller the entity, the more difficult it will be to
fully bypass the alleged harasser in the complaint process. There
should always be a person or group—for example, a governing
Board of a congregation—that can be sensibly empowered to hear
399. See Elvig, 375 F.3d at 973.
400. 375 F.3d at 975. Indeed, this is similar to the course that Ms. Perich’s case took
in Hosanna-Tabor. See Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & School v. EEOC,
565 U.S. 171, 179 (2012) (reciting that the school rescinded Ms. Perich’s “call” as a
response to her insubordination).
401. Elvig, 375 F.3d at 963.
402. Id. at 953.
403. Id. at 959.
404. Id. at 963.
405. Lawton, supra note 149, at 257–58 (explaining that rational fear of retribution
can, at times, lead to reasonable delay in reporting harassment).
406. Id. at 202.
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the complaints and begin the inquiry.407
E. The Scope of Discovery
The ministerial exception often invites questions related to
discovery. A particular problem arises when the parties dispute
whether the plaintiff is a ministerial employee.408 In such a case,
the defendant is asserting that the merits of the challenged job
action against the plaintiff are constitutionally off-limits to inquiry.409 As one of the authors of this piece has recently argued,410
when a defendant has raised the ministerial exception in a motion for summary judgment, courts should exercise their discretion to limit discovery to factual questions related to disposition
of that issue. If the court finds that the plaintiff is not a ministerial employee, discovery on other issues related to quality of employee performance can properly proceed.411
Sexual harassment cases brought by those who, without
question, fall into the ministerial exception do not raise the same
sort of sequencing issues.412 As the panel opinions in both Bollard
and Elvig explain, discovery in hostile environment cases can be
limited to factual questions related to the workplace relationship.413 Because the ministerial exception bars inquiry into evaluation of the plaintiff’s job performance, discovery into such matters is constitutionally out of bounds.414 Of course, the plaintiff
may dispute the applicability of the ministerial exception in a
harassment case challenging an adverse job action.415 In such circumstances, discovery into the applicability of the exception
should precede discovery into job performance.416 There is no reason to delay discovery into a hostile environment, because that
407. Id. at 231 n.157.
408. Smith & Tuttle, supra note 56, at 23.
409. Id. at 1.
410. Id. at 34.
411. Id. at 35.
412. Id. at 19.
413. Elvig v. Calvin Presbyterian Church, 375 F.3d 951, 967–68 (9th Cir. 2004), reh’g
denied, 397 F.3d 790 (9th Cir. 2005); Bollard v. Cal. Province of the Soc’y of Jesus, 196
F.3d 940, 950 (9th Cir. 1999) (“The limited nature of the inquiry, combined with the
ability of the district court to control discovery, can prevent a wide-ranging intrusion into
sensitive religious matters.”).
414. Elvig, 375 F.3d at 967.
415. Bollard, 196 F.3d at 947.
416. Smith & Tuttle, supra note 56, at 1.
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claim may proceed whether or not the ministerial exception applies.417
F. Remedies in Hostile Environment Cases
In every decision in the sexual harassment quartet, the court
addressed the question of available remedies.418 As we noted at
the end of Part II, in a sexual harassment case unconstrained by
the ministerial exception, remedies may include compensatory
and punitive damages for the environmental harassment; orders
of reinstatement; and forward-looking compensatory damages in
cases of a wrongful job action—that is, a remedy designed to put
the plaintiff in the financial place she would have been without
the discriminatory job action.419
In the harassment quartet, every judge who addressed remedial questions agreed that the forward-looking remedies of reinstatement and lost pay in consequence of an adverse job action
were off limits.420 This conclusion follows logically from the initial
move that adverse job action claims are barred by the ministerial
exception.421 Because the defendant religious entity has
unfettered discretion to terminate its relationship with a cleric,
the court may neither inquire into the reasons for that action nor
provide the relief that ordinarily accompanies an unlawful termination.422
Limiting the substance of harassment claims to those that
arise from the workplace environment has sharp and obvious remedial consequences. In the vast majority of cases that involve a
severe and pervasive hostile environment, damages will include
those that arose from the infliction of emotional distress.423 In a
case like McKelvey, where the Diocese communicated an intent to
recover a subsidy for payment of educational expenses,424 remedies may also include an order of setoff in favor of the plaintiff.425
417. Id. at 42.
418. Bollard, 196 F.3d at 950; Elvig, 375 F.3d at 966; McKelvey v. Pierce, 800 A.2d
840, 858–59; Black v. Snyder, 471 N.W.2d 715, 720–21 (Minn. Ct. App. 1991).
419. See supra Part II.
420. Bollard, 196 F.3d at 950.
421. Elvig, 375 F.3d at 953.
422. Bollard, 196 F.3d at 948–49.
423. McKelvey, 800 A.2d at 846.
424. Id.
425. Bollard alluded to a theory of “constructive discharge” when the harassment
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In harassment cases, an employer may defend against
requests for punitive damages by showing that it has made “good
faith efforts to enforce an antidiscrimination policy.”426 We have
found no cases about sexual harassment of clergy in which this
defense has been put into play. It resonates with the terms of the
Ellerth-Faragher affirmative defense, although it is obviously
more lenient.427 This defense allows escape from punitive damages, through a showing of good faith, even if a policy against harassment is legally insufficient to satisfy the requirements of the
affirmative defense.428
We see no reason to believe that a demand for a good faith
effort will involve any intrusion into the authority of religious
entities to choose their leaders. The sexual harassment carve-out
from the ministerial exception has at its base the principle that
religious entities, like all other employers, must protect their employees from certain kinds of indignity and disrespect.429 Once we
recognize the substantive justice and constitutional acceptability
of that principle, it seems completely appropriate to conclude that
an entity that has not even made a good faith effort to enforce its
antiharassment policy bears responsibility for the harms done in
its workplace.430 Consciously ignoring reports of a severe and pervasive hostile environment invites punishment. Courts face no
constitutional impediment to applying this notion of good faith
effort to religious organizations, precisely as it applies to secular
employers.431
G. A Closing Note on Other Theories of the Ministerial Exception
and Their Relationship to Sexual Harassment

leads the complainant to abandon the position. 196 F.3d at 947 (“[C]onstructive
discharge in the context of Bollard’s Title VII sexual harassment claim functions only to
signal his estimation of the severity of the harassment and to lay the foundation for
including lost wages in a calculation of damages.”). When the plaintiff leaves the job
without experiencing any adverse job action, a damage award for lost back pay does not
interfere with a religious entity’s judgment about whom it wants in ministry.
426. Kolstad v. Am. Dental Ass’n, 527 U.S. 526, 546 (D.D.C. 1999). Note that Kolstad
appeared just one year after Ellerth and Faragher.
427. Compare Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 775 (1998), with Kolstad,
527 U.S. at 528.
428. Kolstad, 527 U.S. at 544.
429. Smith & Tuttle, supra note 56, at 8.
430. Kolstad, 527 U.S. at 544.
431. Faragher, 24 U.S. at 805.
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We believe it would be illuminating to compare our theory of
the ministerial exception, including the vital distinction between
hostile environment claims and adverse job action claims in sexual harassment cases, to the approaches taken by other scholars.
We have already noted our disagreement with some feminist
scholars, who would eliminate or severely circumscribe the ministerial exception.432
The scholars who defend the ministerial exception fall into
three primary categories: (1) those who defend a very broad concept of church autonomy or sovereignty (the “institutionalists”);
(2) those who argue that the ministerial exception arises from a
concept of religious voluntarism, which in turn supports a doctrine of implied consent to discrimination (“implied consent” theorists); and (3) those who defend the exception as an incident of
freedom of association, available to secular as well as religious
entities (“associational freedom theorists”).433
For reasons we explain at length in earlier work, all three
approaches are badly flawed.434 Almost none of their proponents,
however, have responded to our general critique,435 or to our focused challenge that they consider the case of sexual harassment
of clergy.436 We imagine scholars in each of these camps might
have more to say in response to both our general critique and our
432. See Lupu & Tuttle, The Mystery of Unanimity, supra note 4 and accompanying
texts.
433. Michael Helfand, Implied Consent: A Primer and a Defense, 50 CONN. L. REV.
1, 3–4, 10, 16 (forthcoming, 2018) [hereinafter Helfand, Implied Consent].
434. Lupu & Tuttle, The Mystery of Unanimity, supra note 4, at 1297–1310.
435. Professor Michael Helfand is a notable exception. He has in several recent
articles analyzed problems of sexual misconduct—including abuse of minors—within
religious institutions. In both pieces, Professor Helfand argues that such problems
should be analyzed exclusively under the Free Exercise Clause, and that “strict scrutiny”
is the appropriate methodology for courts to use. See Helfand, Implied Consent, supra
note 433, at 19–24 nn. 83–96; Michael Helfand, Religious Institutionalism, Implied
Consent, and the Value of Voluntarism, 88 S.CAL. L. REV. 539, 552 n.64 (2015). Professor
Helfand has not applied his preferred test to questions of sexual harassment of
employees. As we have explained above, the Court’s treatment of the ministerial
exception in Hosanna-Tabor relies considerably on the Establishment Clause as a bar
to judicial decision of ecclesiastical questions. Accordingly and wisely, the Court avoids
“strict scrutiny” or any other method of interest balancing in such cases. It is not at all
obvious to us that Hosanna-Tabor would be decided the same way under Helfand’s
approach. The government has a compelling interest in encouraging reports of unlawful
conduct to the EEOC. Prohibiting retaliation against employees who report (such as
Cheryl Perich) is narrowly tailored to that interest.
436. Lupu & Tuttle, The Mystery of Unanimity, supra note 4, at 1303–04 (challenging
“freedom of the church” theorists and “implied consent” theorists to apply their ideas to
cases involving sexual harassment of clergy).
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specific challenge.
CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court’s 2012 decision in Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & School v. EEOC surprised many observers in its breadth, precise grounds of decision, and unanimity.437 The decision left open, however, the distinct possibility that
some legal claims involving clergy and their employers might still
be open to legal redress. As this Article has demonstrated and
defended, claims by clergy that their work environment is
severely and pervasively hostile fall perfectly into that opening.
In a time when many women are bravely chronicling their experiences in hostile workplaces, this reassurance that religious entities are not entirely immune from suit, just as they are not immune from criticism, should be most welcome.

437. See Helfand, Implied Consent, supra note 433, at 12.

